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INTRODUCTION

n the past three decades, the activities of the federal judiciary have
become increasingly controversial.' Changes in the kinds of issues that
have come before the courts and in the ways that judges have handled
those disputes have provoked both vigorous arguments in the legal and
lay communities and considerable self-scrutiny on the part of judges. In
the past few years, these inquiries have given rise to a series of proposals
for changes in the structure and jurisdiction of the federal courts, and
discussion of the merits of various proposals has begun to take on a life of
its own.
Over the course of my own career, I have watched the development of
these controversies from the perspectives, successively, of law student,
practicing attorney, law professor, and, now, appellate judge. After only
four years on the bench, I lack sufficient experience to make definitive or
final judgments on any of the issues that currently command popular and
professional attention. I have, however, practiced the crafts of lawyering
and judging long enough to have some tentative views on certain of these
topics. Because I have discovered that my ideas sometimes differ from
any of the currently contending positions, I am prompted to publish at
this juncture.
In undertaking to write about "The Role of a Judge In Modern Society," I started with great caution, lest self-indulgence replace what I perceived to be legitimate motives for authorship. I put pen to paper to address issues that I believe to be of great importance; to satisfy my own
intellectual curiosity; to salve a restlessness that I have felt over the many
unsolved problems now confronting the legal profession; and to offer cer-

I date the beginning of this turmoil by reference to the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Controversy over the behavior of the federal
judiciary of course preceded Brown. Indeed, in at least three previous eras in American
history-the period immediately preceding and following the decision in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); the years following the decision in Scott v. Sanford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (the Dred Scott case); and the 1930s-the conduct of the
Supreme Court and of the federal judiciary in general was the topic of even more intense
discussion. Nevertheless, Brown and the decisions that followed in its wake seem to have
precipitated a new kind (if not a new level) of controversy. See G. McDowell, Curbing the
Courts: Responses to Judicial Activism, 1857-1981, at 21-34 (Oct. 1, 1981) (unpublished
manuscript) (presented at American Enterprise Institute Conference on Judicial Power in
the U.S.).
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tain of my own preliminary judgments in the hope that they may contribute to the ongoing debates regarding the legal system in the United
States. It should be understood, however, that these considerations
merely explain why I am writing and do not purport to promise any
grand scheme for the reform of our judicial system.
With the foregoing thoughts in mind, I will make no pretensions to sage
pronouncements in dealing with the subject of "the role of a judge in
modern society." Nevertheless, I feel no timidity in wrestling with this
subject because I believe that it warrants a continuous, full and candid
airing. We must, for example, consider that the life of a federal judge has
changed in dramatic ways since the days when the likes of Chief Justice
John Marshall, Justice Holmes, Justice Brandeis, Justice Frankfurter,
Justice Cardozo and Judge Learned Hand were the dominant forces in
the federal judiciary. These changes have many potential sources: expanding law school curriculums (that have likely affected the thinking of
many judges); the use by lawyers of highly sophisticated technological
systems for communication, record keeping, research, and drafting; the
presence of more judges, more law clerks, more secretaries, more central
staff attorneys, and an Administrative Office of the Courts, producing a
recognizable "bureaucracy" within the federal judicial system; an enormously expanding caseload, both in the quantity of cases heard and the
mix of substantive issues; and, possibly, some significant changes in the
backgrounds and personal philosophies of the persons now serving as
judges. Because of these events, and the possible effects that they have
had on our system of justice, it seems to me reasonable to focus on the
role of a judge in modern society. I find persuasive the argument that, at
least with respect to certain ethical matters, the role of a judge remains
(or should remain) constant throughout history. But since judges no
longer function in settings that resemble the environs of Justice Holmes
or Judge Learned Hand, it would be foolhardy to ignore this reality. In
reflecting on the role of a judge, therefore, I will principally have in mind
the working circumstances of jurists sitting on the federal appellate bench
today.
In a recent article, I addressed one aspect of the complex of issues facing federal judges-the problems allegedly attendant upon the
"bureaucratization" of the decisionmaking process at the appellate level.'
The present paper considers a different set of questions: taking as given
3
the current organization, jurisdiction, and caseload of the federal courts,

Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal
Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IOWA

L.

REV.

871 (1983).

Consequently, beyond the scope of this article are many of the "hottest" topics regarding the activities of the federal judiciary: the desirability of creating a new court
designed either to filter cases going to the Supreme Court or to resolve intercircuit conflicts;
whether certain controversial remedies should be declared beyond the power of federal
3
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how might appellate judges alter their habits and attitudes so as to perform better their allotted tasks and how might Congress alter its own
practices so as to facilitate the refinement and more effective utilization
of appellate adjudication?
The ensuing discussion of those topics is divided into three sections.
Part I identifies and explicates the postulates of the analysis; it also describes a few salient features of modern federal appellate adjudication
that must be considered in any critique of our judicial system. Part II
advances four modest proposals for improvement in the "judicial function." Part III examines ways in which Congress might enable the appellate courts to do their job better.

I.

DECIDING APPEALS:

A.

How

THE CRAFT IS PRACTICED

Now

"The Judge as a Legislator"

Appellate judges sometimes make law. Both participants in and observers of the judicial process have recognized this fact for many years.5 One
might expect that today, more than a half-century after the Legal Realist
movement,' the phenomenon of the exercise of "judicial discretion"
would have been so exhaustively studied as to merit no more than a passing reference in preparation for the examination of more controversial
matters. That turns out not to be true. Not only does the activity of judicial lawmaking remain mysterious, but a surprisingly large number of
people, both within and without the legal community, question its legiti7
macy in any form.
It is certainly not my intent, in this article, to speak the last word on
"judicial legislation." However, many of the suggestions made below con-

courts; whether appellate courts now have too much or too little business, etc.
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98 (1921).
See, e.g., id. at 113, 115, 166; J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 357 n.4 (Anchor
Books ed. 1963) (Austin referred to the "childish fiction" that judges never make law);
Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 24 (1924); Traynor, La Rude Vita,
La Dolce Giustizia; or Hard Cases Can Make Good Law, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 234 (1962).
' For representative "legal realist" studies of the role of "discretion" in adjudication,
see, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 5; Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935); Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931). Insightful secondary studies of the movement and its legacy include E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY
74-94, 159-78 (1973); Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934); Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28
BUFFALO L. REV. 459 (1979).
7 See, e.g., Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1108 (1975) (arguing that
departures from the "right" answer are unjust to the losing party) [hereinafter cited as
Dworkin, Hard Cases]; Selection and Confirmation of Federal Judges: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 228-29 (1979) (colloquy between
Sen. Hatch and Nominee Wald), excerpted in Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
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cern ways in which judges might profitably conduct themselves when, in
"doubtful cases," they are called upon to exercise the "sovereign prerogative of choice." Accordingly, it seems incumbent upon me at least to
summarize my notions regarding when, how, and why judges exercise discretion or-in the words of Justice Cardozo-act "creatively." 9
To avoid misunderstanding-and to enable me to skirt the most tangled of the jurisprudential thickets in this field-I would make clear that
I mean to venture no opinion on two questions. First, I will offer no view
on the extent to which it is theoretically possible to eliminate discretion
in the adjudicatory process. 10 Second, I will state no opinion as to the
degree of discretion that would be optimal if one were designing a judicial
system from scratch." Moreover, I wish to distance myself as much as
possible from the question of whether our legal system may be described
as "autonomous," i.e., distinct from the spheres of morals and of politics
in general. 2 My concern, rather, is with a more mundane set of questions:
how often and to what extent do modern federal appellate judges feel
"constrained" to decide cases in particular ways (i.e. to eschew reliance
on ill-defined discretion), and in what senses are they in fact so bound?
1. A Descriptive Breakdown
Appellate cases are idiosyncratic; it is therefore difficult to generalize
meaningfully about their susceptibility to determinate resolution. Nevertheless, maintenance of some sense of proportion in the following discussion necessitates identification of at least some crude categories.
During a twelve-month court term, I participate in the resolution of
approximately 175 to 200 cases's I would estimate that approximately
8 See O.W. HOLMES, LAW IN SCIENCE AND SCIENCE IN LAW 239 (1920).
' See B. CARDOZO, supra note 4, at 115.

"0For several of the many works addressing this question, see Dworkin, Hard Cases,
supra note 7; Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Dworkin, No Right Answer?]; Dworkin, Seven Critics, 11 GA. L. REV. 1201 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Dworkin, Seven Critics]. But see, e.g., Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of
Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823 (1972).
" See generally Hazard, The Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1978).
" For discussions of this issue, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); Dworkin,
Hard Cases, supra note 7; Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Dworkin, The Model of Rules]; Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The HartIDworkinDispute, 75 MICH. L. REV. 473 (1977); Weinreb, Law as
Order, 91 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1978). Insofar as any of the following discussion implicates
this longstanding tussle between the advocates of positivism and the advocates of natural
law (or "nonpositivism"), those implications are either unintended or incidental.
"' I include in this number cases heard on the merits by three-judge panels, cases
reheard en banc, and numerous motions dispositions. At least 65 to 75% of the cases heard
are dispositions on the merits. In addition, judges routinely consider miscellaneous matters
such as petitions for rehearing en banc, tentative decisions by colleagues, remand orders
from the Supreme Court, petitions for costs and fees, etc.
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one-half of the cases decided are "easy"; the pertinent legal rules seem to
me unambiguous and their application to the facts appears clear. Stated
differently, assuming that I hear 200 cases per year, I feel strictly bound
when deciding 100 of those cases. A dispute falling into this category, I
believe, admits of only one "right answer"; were I to vote to decide it in
any other way, I would expect to be accused of having made an error, not
merely of having voted or ruled unwisely.
In the remaining 100 cases, the answers are not so clear. In only a relatively small subset of these, however, do I feel I may and must exercise
what I will call "discretion."1 ' Using rough numbers, I would say that in
only five to fifteen percent of the disputes that come before me do I conclude, after reviewing the record and all the pertinent legal materials,
that the competing arguments drawn from those sources are equally
strong. Put differently, only in those few cases do I feel that fair application of the law to the facts leaves me in equipoise, and that to dispose
of
5
the appeal I must rely on some significant measure of discretion.1
That leaves roughly thirty-five to forty-five percent of the cases per
year that are neither "easy" nor "very hard" in the senses just described.
In appeals falling into this middle category, each party is able to make at
least one legal argument that I find colorable, but, after research, reflection, and discussion, the argument(s) advanced by one party seem to me
demonstrably stronger than the argument(s) advanced by the other.

14 The word "discretion" takes on different coloring as it is placed in different jurispru-

dential theories. For a good summary and analysis of its various usages, see Greenawalt,
Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 359 (1975). For my own purposes, I find Greenawalt's own approach the
most sensible and will rely upon it in this article. The essence of his view is as follows:
I believe. . . that when a judge is left to decide among controversial and complex theories of moral and social philosophy, each of which can find some support
in our structure of government, all the legal profession demands and all the framers of statutes and constitutional provisions could reasonably expect is that a
judge act reasonably and conscientiously choose the theories he thinks soundest. If
these two requisites are met, we do not think the judge's actions merit blame, a
typical consequence of a perceived failure to perform a duty, even though we
would have acted differently. It is in this sense at least that we can say that a
judge has discretion when faced with very difficult cases.
Id. at 377.
For the purposes of the present experiential account, I will describe appeals in which I
feel obliged and entitled to exercise "discretion," in the foregoing sense, as "very hard"
cases-as distinguished from appeals which are difficult to resolve but in which I believe I
can discern a "right" answer by reference to extant legal materials, which I will describe (in
deference to contemporary usage, see Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 7) as simply "hard."
For a discussion of the latter category, see infra text accompanying note 16.
" Indeed, were I to break down my docket into segregable legal questions presented for
resolution on appeal, the percentage falling into the category of "very hard" would be even
lower. In other words, my sense is that in only about 5 to 15% of the cases heard per year
am I confronted with an issue that requires me to exercise discretion; usually such cases also
present one or more other issues that can be resolved without much difficulty.
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Under such circumstances, I feel constrained to render judgment in favor
of the party who can make the more compelling
claims. The legal arguments to which I have been referring can take
any of a variety of forms.
Among the more common are: a statutory or
constitutional provision
should (in view of its underlying purpose and/or
legislative history) be
read in a particular manner; the facts found by
the agency or court below,
when viewed through the lens of the pertinent
standard of review, and
when compared to the facts of similar cases that
have been decided in the
past, demonstrably do or do not satisfy the applicable
substantive norm;"6
a particular prior decision was either so manifestly
erroneous when decided, or has been so undermined by subsequent
doctrinal development,
as to be susceptible of reconsideration and overruling.
The sense in which
claims of these kinds can or must be described
as "legal" turns out to be
very difficult to define. For now, I confine myself
to a simple experiential
observation: when constructing and assessing
arguments like these, I do
not feel as though I am drawing upon any personal
values or that I am
exercising any real measure of discretion or free
choice.
Most of my colleagues would, I think, concur
in the foregoing breakdown of the kinds of cases that appear before
us. Some would, of course,
place slightly different numbers of cases in each
of the three categories,
but most would find accurate the overall description
of the experience of
deciding various kinds of appeals.
Trouble would arise, however, were I to ask myself
and my colleagues
which cases should be placed in each of the categories.
Our opinions regarding which cases are "easy" would probably
be reassuringly consistent.
Presented with a random batch of appeals, almost
all judges of the court
on which I sit would likely identify about fifty
percent as "clearcut";
more importantly, they would pick the same
fifty percent and vote to
"oCardozo described cases in which (only) arguments
of this kind are presented as
In another and considerable percentage [of cases],
the rule of law is certain, and
the application alone doubtful. A complicated record
must be
tives of witnesses, more or less incoherent and unintelligible, dissected, the narramust be analyzed, to
determine whether a given situation comes within one
district or another upon the
chart of rights and wrongs. The traveler who knows
that a railroad crosses his
path must look for approaching trains. That is at least
the general rule. In numberless litigations the description of the landscape must
be studied to see whether
vision has been obstructed, whether something has
been done or omitted to put
the traveler off his guard. Often these cases and others
like them provoke difference of opinion among judges. Jurisprudence remains
untouched, however, regardless of the outcome.
B. CARDOZO, supra note 4, at 164-65. Cardozo's concluding
observation seems to me clearly
incorrect. Whether one views the decision in a case
of this sort as establishing another precedent in the field or as refining the substantive norm
itself through its application, it certainly will affect future cases implicating the same
legal rule. "Jurisprudence," in other
words, is most certainly "touched," however lightly.

follows:
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decide them the same way.1 7 With regard to which of the cases were "very
hard" (i.e., requiring the exercise of discretion) or merely "hard," however, there would be prominent divergences of opinion. Even more serious
is the fact that, in a number of these cases, we would probably disagree
not only over how the cases should be classified, but over the proper outcome. Given these realities, one might legitimately ask whether any judge
is ever truly constrained in his or her decisionmaking in cases outside of
the "easy" category. That question I defer for the moment.'" To prepare
for eventual consideration of it, I return to examination of the underpinnings of my individual responses to the cases that come before me.
2.

A First-Level Explanation

I find it helpful to analyze in two stages the questions of when, how,
and why I (and my colleagues) do in fact exercise discretion when deciding appeals. The first level of the analysis proceeds on the assumption
that the foregoing description of my (and their) sense of what we are doing is accurate, and attempts to account for the varying degrees of constraint to which we are subject in different kinds of cases. The second
level begins with a recognition that the explanation elaborated on the
first level is vulnerable to several powerful objections, and then tries to
develop a more refined theory that takes those objections into account.
Bifurcating the inquiry in this way is of course somewhat artificial (and
requires some patience on the part of the reader), but it has the advantage of illuminating the way my own thinking on these questions has
evolved and the way I think the attitudes of many other judges have
developed.
I indicated above that about half of the cases that come before me I
find "easy" because the governing legal rules are unambiguous and clearly
apply to the facts of the disputes. 19 If pressed, I would qualify that expla-

" This unanimity, in practice, makes possible summary disposition of a substantial percentage of the cases that come before the D.C. Circuit.
1" It, along with other sources of doubt concerning the determinacy of our decisionmaking, is discussed infra in Part I.A.3.
" See Hart, Positivism and the Separationof Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
607, 614-15 (1958) (accounting for the easiness of "easy cases" in roughly these terms). Cf.
M. BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHORS 95-139 (1962) (explicating the concept of a "simple
rule" in the sense in which Hart uses it).
I have decided, in this discussion, to make use of some of the terminology current in
contemporary Anglo-American jurisprudence for two reasons. First, it enables me to condense my argument somewhat-relying on the reader's familiarity with (or ability to find
out) the glosses these terms have acquired. Second, it enables me to comment (without
straying too much from my proper path) on the descriptive features of some of the currently
popular theories. Cf. Soper, supra note 12, at 473 (classifying legal theories as "conceptual,
descriptive, or normative"). My occasional use of a term that figures prominently in the
work of one or another theorist should not, however, be read to imply adherence to any of
the normative or conceptual assertions he builds upon it. (For a revealing demonstration of
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nation in two respects. First, I would admit that underlying my casual
description of those rules as governing lies an implicit assessment of the
relevance of a competing set of principles. Thus, for example, my sense
that a doctrine promulgated in a prior decision by another panel of the
court is well-established and controlling derives from a (usually subconscious) determination that the principle favoring adherence to that doctrine (stare decisis) is powerful, and that the considerations that might be
advanced for limiting or overruling it (e.g., that it has proven unworkable
in practice or that several other circuits have persuasively rejected it) are
either inapposite or weak in the appeal before me. 21 Second, I would acknowledge that my sense that a rule clearly covers the facts of a case,
even though it has never before been applied in precisely those circumstances, rests upon a determination (also usually subconscious) that application of the rule to the case would further the purpose underlying the
21
norm.
Once the account of the activity of deciding "easy" cases has been qualified in the foregoing manner, it becomes applicable, with only slight
modification, to the activity of deciding "hard" cases-i.e., those in which
a judge must weigh competing, colorable legal arguments but in which he
or she is not free to exercise any significant measure of discretion. The
only difference between the two contexts is that, in "hard" cases, identification and evaluation of the principles and policies that lie behind or beneath the simple rules is conscious and crucial. Thus, for example, to determine the meaning of an ambiguous phrase used in a statute, I make a
deliberate effort to identify the objectives the enactment is designed to
promote and then select the interpretation that would most effectively
advance those ends.2 Alternatively (or in addition), I look for guidance to
some principle of statutory interpretation such as the tenet that criminal
statutes should be construed narrowly 23 or the doctrine that the provisions exempting federal governmental agencies from their duty of disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2 ' should be construed restrictively.28 Another example: To determine whether a judicially-created

the way in which a descriptive concept developed in one theoretical context can be readily
assimilated into another, see id. at 480 n.25.)
20 See Dworkin, The Model of Rules, supra note 12, at 37-39.
" See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630, 662-69 (1958).
22 See Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV. L. REV.
370 (1947); Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 7, at 1085-87; Dworkin, No Right Answer?,
supra note 10, at 12-13; Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 538-44 (1947); Fuller, supra note 21, at 662-69; Traynor, Reasoning in
a Circle of Law, 56 VA. L. REV. 739, 747-48 (1970). For a recent example of overt utilization
of this method, see Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 546-65 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
" See Soper, supra note 12, at 492-95.
24 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982).
5 See, e.g., Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 566-68 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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cause of action (or immunity from liability) is fairly applicable to a borderline case, I develop a theory that accounts for as many as possible of
the prior judicial decisions interpreting the doctrine in question, and then
use the resultant construct to make sense of the dispute before me.2
Note that none of the foregoing approaches (used subconsciously in
"easy" cases and consciously in "hard" ones) should entail a departure
from the law. All of the principles, policies, and theories to which I turn
for assistance are embodied in or can be extracted from extant legal
materials. The objectives underlying a statute are inferred from the structure of the enactment and its legislative history.2" The existence, character, and strength of a maxim of statutory interpretation are determined
by examining prior decisions in which it was (or might have been but was
not) applied.2 The shape of a doctrinal theory is strongly influenced by
the pattern of precedents it is designed to explain and synthesize.2 9 In
other words, when employing these techniques for the resolution of
"hard" cases, an appellate judge need not-and should not-advert to his
personal values.
There are, however, occasional cases in which even the foregoing approaches prove ineffectual. Some statutes are so internally inconsistent,
or are designed to promote so many cross-cutting purposes, that it is extremely difficult for a mortal judge to determine what interpretation of a
particular provision would best advance the act's underlying objectives.2
Sometimes two or more inconsistent maxims of statutory interpretations
apply to the same case, and comparison of the facts of the decisions in
which each has been invoked in the past with the facts of the case at bar
fails to make clear which maxim is entitled to greater weight." And, on
occasion, the set of decisions interpreting a judicially-created doctrine is

26 See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 7, at 1087-1101. For a recent example of overt
reliance on this approach, see Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 497-502 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
27 See Frankfurter, supra note 22, at 543-44.
"' See Raz, supra note 10, at 848. As my phrasing of this point suggests, I adhere to the
view, espoused by Raz (among others), that a principle becomes embodied in the law and
acquires a particular weight (i.e., an ability to override or offset competing principles) by
"convention"-acceptance by the judiciary over a period of time. I do not pause to consider
whether such a view is compatible with a conceptual theory founded on the notion that the
question of whether a particular norm qualifies as "legal" must always be determined with
reference (direct or indirect) to some "master rule." See H.L.A. HART, supra note 12;
H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (1967).
IS See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 7, at 1087-1101; Dworkin, Seven Critics, supra
note 10, at 1252-53; Sartorious, Social Policy and Judicial Legislation, 8 AM. PHIL. Q. 151
(1971).
30 A notorious example of a statute of this sort is the Civil Service Reform Act. See, e.g.,
Devine v. White, 697 F.2d 421, 433-40 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The issue of how the problems
generated by enactments of this sort might be alleviated is taken up infra in Part III.A.
" See, e.g., Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (en banc) (considering whether an agency law enforcement manual should be exempt
from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act).
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so incoherent that no one theory is capable of making sense of even a fair
proportion of them, and there exists no "metatheory" fairly inferrable
from extant legal materials capable of indicating which theory, among the
various candidates, best accounts for and integrates a reasonable portion
of the case law.3" Cases of these sorts constitute the category I have described as "very hard." Under these circumstances, an appellate judge has
no choice but to exercise discretion in deciding an appeal. But, it should
be emphasized, the instances in which such reliance on discretion is necessary are rare.
3.

A Second-Level Explanation

Unfortunately, when the foregoing explanatory edifice is exposed to
critical scrutiny, cracks become evident. The most obvious of the
problems has already been noted: the fact that appellate judges sometimes disagree on the result in "hard" cases casts doubt on the proposition that, except in rare instances, they are constrained by the extant
materials of the law. To explain the phenomenon of divided opinions, one
seemingly must assume that either 1) judges occasionally make mistakes
when assessing the bearing of established law on cases, 2) judges refuse in
some instances to abide by established law, or 3) the cases in which
judges are exercising discretion are far more frequent than has been suggested up to this point.
The problems arising out of the fact that judges disagree are intensified
by three related theoretical objections that might be made to the explanatory model sketched above. First, as any law student knows, it is very
often possible to argue equally persuasively that a novel situation is or is
not governed by a particular prior decision. This can be achieved by focusing on alternative formulations of the "holding" of the original case,
by stressing similarities or differences in the facts, or by highlighting either those concerns that are common to the two controversies or those
that are not."3 Is it not, then, misleading to suggest that, in a sizable percentage of the cases that come before the federal appellate courts, a wellestablished rule may be extracted from the case law and confidently applied to the problem presented? Second, if the interpretation of a statute
is frequently controlled by a determination of what result would best effectuate the statute's purposes, how is it that those purposes do not alto-

" See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(en banc), cert. granted, - U.S. , 104 S. Ct. 65 (1983); Raz, supra note 10.
"' For provocative (but, in each instance, somewhat overstated) discussions of how and
why it is possible to show that any one case is or is not related to any other, see Deutsch,
Precedent and Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 1553 (1974); Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989
(1978); Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law
Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1307 (1979). For an understated discussion of
the same theme, see H.L.A. HART, supra note 12, at 121-50.
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34
gether overthrow the edict founded on them? And how is it that the
judge, in deciding what reading of a phrase would advance the statute's
ends, avoids injection of his personal views? Third, if Legal Realism
teaches anything, it is that deriving from general rules answers to specific
questions in real cases, using nothing more than ordinary canons of ra8
tionality, is often difficult and sometimes impossible." Is not one of the
implications of that lesson that reference to some complex of underlying
policies or principles is unavoidable when interpreting and applying almost any rule, and, if so, will not the aforementioned corrosion of the rule
by its purposes (and by the judge's opinion of those purposes) occur in a
large number of cases?
In short, the sources of indeterminacy are manifold. Viewed in this
light, the account of appellate adjudication sketched in Parts I.A.1. and
I.A.2. seems less clear than indicated. Nevertheless, I believe that there is
a recognizable and reasonable coherence to our judicial system when the
various elements are re-examined in terms somewhat different from those
stated above.
I start by recognizing that, at least with respect to what I call "easy"
and "hard" (as opposed to "very hard") cases, I and most of my colleagues sincerely feel constrained in the degrees and in the circumstances
described in Part I.A.1. That conviction could, of course, be the product
of self-deception, but it seems unlikely that so many judges could have
been so deluded for so long. Accordingly, we proceed on the assumption
that our common sentiment has some basis in reality.
Clues as to the depth and character of those roots may be derived from
some of the ways in which my predecessors have described the judicial
condition. I find the following passages most evocative:

[W]hen [Mr. Justice Holmes] said that "the meaning of a sentence is to be felt rather than to be proved," he expressed the
wholesome truth that the final rendering of the meaning of a statute is an act of judgment. He would shudder at the thought that
by such a statement he was giving comfort to the school of vis-

The classic explication of this problem is Professor Fuller's:
One can imagine a course of reasoning that might run as follows: This statute says
absinthe shall not be sold. What is its purpose? To promote health. Now, as everyone knows, absinthe is a sound, wholesome, and beneficial beverage. Therefore,
interpreting the statute in the light of its purpose, I construe it to direct a general
sale and consumption of that most healthful of beverages, absinthe.
Fuller, supra note 21, at 670.
3
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 6; O.W. HOLMES, Privilege, Malice and Intent, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 120 (1920); Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal
Realism to CriticalLegal Scholarship,95 HARv. L. REv. 1669, 1673-74 (1982). For contemporary reiterations of the argument (in terms at least as sweeping as those in which the
Realists originally made it), see, e.g., Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351
(1973); Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205 (1981).
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ceral jurisprudence. Judgment is not drawn out of the void but is
based on the correlation of imponderables all of which need not,
because they cannot, be made explicit. He was expressing the
humility of the intellectual that he was, whose standards of exactitude distrusted pretensions of certainty, believing that legal controversies that are not frivolous almost always involve matters of
degree, and often degree of the nicest sort. Statutory construction
implied the exercise of choice, but precluded the notion of capricious choice as much as choice based on private notions of policy.
One gets the impression that in interpreting statutes Mr. Justice
Holmes reached meaning easily, as was true of most of his results,
with emphasis on the language in the totality of the enactment
and the felt reasonablenessof the chosen construction. He had a
lively awareness that a statute was expressive of purpose and policy, but in his reading of it he tended to hug the shores of the
statute itself, without much re-enforcement from without. 6
[A judge] legislates only between gaps. He fills the open
spaces in the law. How far he may go without traveling beyond
the walls of the interstices cannot be staked out for him upon a
chart. He must learn it for himself as he gains the sense of fitness
and proportion that comes with years of habitude in the practice
of an art. Even within the gaps, restrictions not easy to define,
but felt, however impalpable they may be, by every judge and
lawyer, hedge and circumscribe his action. They are established
by the traditions of the centuries, by the example of other judges,
his predecessors and his colleagues, by the collective judgment of
the profession, and by the duty of adherence to the pervading
37
spirit of the law.
Many of the foregoing lines echo the phrases of the analysis set forth in
Part I.A.2.: sensitivity to underlying purposes; identification and weighing of principles embedded in the body of precedent; construction of doctrinal theories that can then be brought to bear on recalcitrant cases, etc.
But there is something more in these passages-something crucial, something necessary and almost sufficient to respond to the serious objections
noted at the outset of this section. Frankfurter may be right that it is
impossible to describe this extra factor with any precision, but identification of its principal sources and components is feasible-and facilitates
both self-understanding and the development of proposals for reforming
the adjudicatory process.
It seems to me that there are at least three critical factors, apart from
basic legal materials and traditional canons of construction, that affect
3" Frankfurter, supra note 22, at 531-32 (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v.
Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 496 (1911)) (emphasis added).
37 B. CARDOZO, supra note 4, at 113-14.
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appellate judges when they decide cases. The first two factors, which I
will refer to as sets of "conventions," implicate the process of appellate
advocacy and decisionmaking. These conventions ensure common approaches to lawyering and judging and, consequently, compel a certain
consistency in behavior among members of the legal profession. Adherence to the conventions thus tends to promote a legal system that is comprehensible to its participants, in large measure because "extreme" behavior is not tolerated. I do not mean to suggest that the conventions are
all good; indeed, in many instances they may stifle effective advocacy and
decisionmaking. Nevertheless, I do believe that the existence of these
conventions facilitates a high level of consistency in the decisions rendered in "easy" cases and a significant level of consistency in the "hard"
cases."
The first set of conventions that I have in mind pertains to permissible
forms of reasoning, sensed and observed by almost all members of the
American legal profession. Precisely because we take these habits of mind
so for granted, it is difficult to identify the ways and occasions in which
they constrain us. The context in which their role and importance is perhaps most evident is analogical reasoning; lawyers gradually acquire a feel
(from law school, from everyday discussions with their colleagues, from
the responses to their briefs and oral arguments) for what kinds of efforts
to link concepts, rules, and cases from distinct spheres of the law are
credible and what kinds are not. The net result is that lawyers have a
sense, different from and more consistent than laypersons' comparable
reference or comparison
sense, of what constitutes a plausible or forceful
3
9
one.
strained
or
weak
a
constitutes
what
and
The second set of conventions to which I am referring pertains to various codes of conduct affecting relations among judges. Certain of these
conventions relate to the internal business of a court: for example, seniority systems to determine who presides on a given judicial panel; procedures for the assignment of cases; and routines governing the circulation
of and comment on proposed opinions. Others relate to codes of behavior
that seek to avoid harmful disruptions in relations among judges: for example, an implicit rule forbidding ad hominem attacks in situations
where a case produces concurring or dissenting opinions, and strict adherence to a rule of confidentiality with respect to the process of decisionmaking in any given case. Still others relate to common standards of
judgment in case handling: for example, general agreements among the
judges as to what types of cases require oral argument and/or written
I do not believe that the conventions significantly affect a judge's view as to whether a
particular case is "very hard." However, the conventions may affect a judge's final decision
in what is perceived to be a "very hard" case (albeit to a lesser degree than in other cases).
" For an interesting account of the nature and role of conventions of this sort, see Abraham, Three Fallacies of Interpretation:A Comment on Precedent and JudicialDecision,
23 Aiuz. L. REv. 771, 777-78 (1981).
U
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opinions; a willingness among judges to adhere to existing precedent; and
a commonly shared disinclination among the judges on a circuit to rehear
cases en banc except in the most compelling circumstances. This last category of conventions may have more to do with ends than means. It consists of a collection of intertwined sensitivities: a feel for what sorts of
decisions can fairly be described as "clarifications," "reforms," or "adjustments" of the body of law and what sorts must be described as "departures" from it; a suspicion of the latter; and a distrust for all lines of
argument that would lead toward the latter. It is this last-mentioned
group of attitudes-which collectively might be called a feel for the limits
4
of the possible "-that
I think Cardozo was referring to when he spoke of
"the duty of adherence to the pervading spirit of the law."'" Put more
bluntly, it is an awareness of where the trodden path lies and a sense, not
only of the danger, but of the impropriety of straying too far from it.2 In
addition to the foregoing conventions, I think that there is a third factor
that affects judicial decisionmaking. This factor relates to the personal
makeup of a judge, including individual characteristics and experiences
such as educational background, family history, family wealth, prior employment, places of birth, growth and current residence, friends and associates, travel, age and, possibly, even sex, race and nationality. Justice
Cardozo best described what I mean when he discussed the effect of the
elusive human factor in judging: "Deep below consciousness are other
forces, the likes, and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the
complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions which make
the man, whether he be litigant or judge." 4 Although this human factor
is difficult to describe and complex in operation, there can be no doubt
that it has an important influence at certain levels of judicial decisionmaking. In particular, I believe that, while most judges strive mightily to
diffuse the impact of the human factor, its influence is felt in three areas:
first, it may explain certain differences of opinion that I argue should not
occur in the disposition of "hard cases"; second, it may meaningfully affect judges' views as to whether particular cases are "very hard" (and
thus admit of the exercise of discretion); and finally, it may explain differences of opinion in the disposition of "very hard" cases. "4
" For an insightful sketch of the ways in which such a vague sense of the limits on the
range of permissible conclusions is likely to affect the decisionmaking process, see Dewey,
supra note 5, at 23.
" See supra text accompanying note 37.
"' It takes some time for a judge to acquire this "feel"-specifically, to learn to recognize
an impermissible "departure" from established law (however impeccable the reasoning that
leads to it). The result is that judges in their early years on the bench may make "mistakes"
of a sort they would never make later.
" B. CARDOZO, supra note 4, at 167.
" A case that may reflect what I have in mind is Community for Creative Non-Violence
v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. granted, U.S.
-, 104 S. Ct. 65
(1983).
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From one vantage point, it may be argued that the influence of the
human factor is at best minimal because 1) judges strive so hard to limit
its influence, and 2) many federal appellate judges are drawn from a
small subset of persons, often in the upper middle class of the American
population. Because of this second consideration, it has been suggested
5
that judges share a world-view. It would serve little purpose, here, to
describe that world-view in any detail, but a few salient features may be
recorded with little difficulty. Most judges value hard work and individual achievement. Of the myriad ways in which government may act to
invade individual liberties, judges are most sensitive to and suspicious of
invasions of privacy and interference with intellectual freedom. Most
judges are hostile toward overt forms of racial or religious discrimination,
but many have ambivalent feelings regarding egalitarianism. These attitudes, no doubt, affect our reading of and responses to the arguments
presented to us and, consequently, influence our decisionmaking.
In the context of cases involving disputes over the proper interpretation of federal statutes and challenges to administrative action pursuant
to statute, the similarities in the world-views of the occupants of the
bench have two related, beneficial effects: they increase the consistency
with which different judges and panels perceive and decide disputes and
they make their decisions more predictable. Those effects are beneficial
for two reasons: they increase the ability of potential litigants to ascertain
in advance their legal rights and to adjust their conduct accordingly and
they enable Congress to draft statutory provisions that, when seen
through the ideological spectacles worn by many of the judiciary, will give
rise to the kinds of entitlements and regulations Congress wishes to
create. 46
Up to now, I have assumed a strong similarity in the backgrounds of
federal appellate judges. I do not wish to overstate this point, however,
because there is another vantage point from which to consider the issue.
In recent years, due to the broader integration of student populations in
law schools and an increasing diversity among the judges appointed to the
federal bench, the pool of judges has changed. As a consequence, we now
recognize that, at some point, the correspondence between the back-

'5 Cf. Cohen, supra note 6, at 845 ("judges usually reflect the attitudes of their own
income class on social questions").
46 The last point merits brief elaboration. I am not suggesting that the members of congressional committees, when considering alternative formulations of statutory provisions,
say to themselves or to one another: Version X is better because, after it has been considered by the meritocratic, mildly egalitarian judges who currently staff the courts of appeals,
it will yield the results we want. The calculus is both less conscious and more subtle. I am
suggesting that members of Congress (particularly experienced ones) probably have a
sense-a sense refined by their awareness of the similarity of the judges' backgrounds-of
what the courts are likely to do with their language, and that sense renders their draftsmanship more precise and effectual.
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grounds and values of different histories varies considerably, and our convictions diverge at many points relevant to the cases that come before us.
A few examples may indicate both the kinds of disagreements that
most often matter when we decide appeals and their importance. Some
judges read exemption 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 47 in the light
of their concern for the protection of national security; others read it in
the light of their fear of governmental inefficiency and mismanagement,
which they believe is fostered by agencies' ability to keep their activities
secret. Some judges view class actions brought under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act,"' relying principally on statistical evidence of sexual discrimination,"' as valuable efforts to dig deep in the social and economic
systems and root out the sources of bigotry; others see them as yet another mechanism for harassing beleaguered American businesses, already
trapped in webs of governmental regulation. Some judges view intercity
busing both as the only effectual means (absent legislative intervention)
of achieving racial equality and as a morally desirable form of collective
penitence; others see it as a crude response to an intractable problem, a
superficial "solution" that, in practice, does little good and seriously
threatens the autonomy and integrity of our urban neighborhoods. 0
When a "very hard" case comes before us that implicates an issue of
the sort just described, in which both parties are able to advance strong
legal arguments,5 1 our analyses, votes, and opinions often diverge. It is
crucial to recognize, however, that, when we analyze, discuss, and write
about cases of this kind, we usually not only feel constrained, but, in one
limited but still meaningful sense, we are constrained. Our personal convictions often are so deep-seated that, without our being aware of it, they
mostly affect the weight that we assign to each of the various principles
and policies marshalled by the parties. Consequently, we still feel as
though we are fairly and dispassionately assessing the legal issues
presented, even in the "very hard" cases that admit of no right answer.
Our personal beliefs are, usually, too general or subconscious to have a
direct impact on a decision in a "hard" or "very hard" case. And, except
in cases involving "very hard" constitutional adjudications, judges rarely
(if ever) make reference to personal belief or ideology as justification for a
decision.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1982).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
4" See, e.g., Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
"0For a discussion of the way evolving attitudes of this order may affect a judge's decisionmaking and writing, see Note, The Changing Social Vision of Justice Blackmun, 96
HARV. L. REv. 717 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Changing Social Vision].
" By "strong legal arguments," I mean the kinds of claims, extractable from extant legal
materials, described supra in the text accompanying notes 22-29. When one of the parties to
an appeal is unable to present an argument of this order, the kinds of differences in outlook
under discussion are irrelevant to the decisionmaking process.
47

8
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Notwithstanding the foregoing comments, it remains clear to me that
an undefined number of judges are influenced by what I have called the
human factor in a not insignificant number of "hard" and "very hard"
cases. This may be explained on the basis of four factors (operating separately or in combination). First, in some cases (that I have called "very
hard") there simply is no right answer. No (non-Herculean) judge is able
to identify a single solution that best promotes the pertinent statutory
purposes or that is required by a doctrinal theory that best fits the relevant extant norms. The judges, consequently, must exercise discretion in
"very hard" cases, and they frequently exercise it in different ways." Second, some matters (in the "hard" and "very hard" categories of cases)
both present close legal questions and implicate important social issues
over which some judges may deeply disagree. The result is that, though
they feel and, in one narrow sense, are in fact constrained, they cast their
votes differently for the reasons described above. Third, some few judges
occasionally may be unwilling to abide by established law because of personal disagreements with it. It other words, some judges are prone to be
result-oriented. My experience suggests that the number of judges and
cases affected by this affliction is small. Fourth, judges sometimes make
mistakes. Momentary lapses of attention when reading pertinent statutes
and cases, inadequate guidance from counsel, and pressure generated by a
heavy, diverse caseload lead every judge, on occasion, to weigh the competing considerations differently than he would if he had more time and
help. Although I am inclined to believe (or at least hope) that the effects
of these four factors are minor, I do not think that they can be ignored as
inconsequential.
Aside from the "hard" and "very hard" cases, it is encouraging to realize that approximately fifty percent of our docket is disposed of with little difficulty. The fact that we are able to dispose summarily of roughly
fifty percent of the cases we hear derives from the gross imbalance of the
competing legal arguments presented, when placed on a scale structured
by 1) a set of conventions peculiar to the American bar, 2) a set of conventions peculiar to the federal judiciary, and 3) the world-view shared
(more or less) by a number of judges now sitting on the federal bench.
4. A Concluding Observation
Pursuant to the re-examination of judicial decisionmaking in
Part I.A.3., I believe that we can see an identifiable and coherent system

" The proposition that I lack discretion in such circumstances because, even though I
am incapable of discerning it, there exists a single right answer to the question presented,
see Dworkin, No Right Answer?, supra note 10, I find both highly implausible, see supra
note 32, and unhelpful. For the purposes of this article, I will continue to describe as "discretionary" all decisions in which a mortal judge would be unable to identify a correct solution if his attention were confined to extant legal material. See supra note 14.
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of appellate adjudication. Despite the fact that not all judges agree on the
breakdown of "hard" versus "very hard" cases, and not all judges will
agree on the dispositions of these cases, the divergences of opinion among
judges are subject to explanation. I do not mean to endorse fully the present system as infallible (or as unaffected by ideological influences).
Rather, I mean to argue that the appellate process does reflect a system
that is susceptible of analysis; and, most importantly, careful analysis
yields a conclusion that judges are significantly constrained in their
decisionmaking.
B.

Some Contingent Factors

The scheme of things just described is not ineluctable. Several of the
factors discussed might be altered relatively easily. Four merit special
attention:
(a) The Selection Process. Were judges more diverse, their decisionmaking might be less consistent-and, arguably, would have a less predictable ideological twist.
(b) Statutory Incoherence. The more fragmentary and internally inconsistent the enactments the courts have to interpret, the less constrained is their decisionmaking.
(c) Codification. Many of the bodies of doctrine that currently are
most chaotic-and consequently yield the most unpredictable decisions-are tangled primarily because they have evolved solely through judicial construction and elaboration. 3 The chaos arguably could be much
reduced by legislative intervention.
(d) Caseloads. The bigger the dockets, the less time we spend on the
difficult cases and the more mistakes we make.
II.

"THE WAYS OF A JUDGE":" SOME PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN
THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION

Set forth below are four proposals regarding ways in which I think an
appellate judge should think and act if he is to do his job as well as he
can. When referring to an individual judge in the subsequent discussion I
frequently use male pronouns such as "he," "his," etc. This language is
employed simply to avoid the awkwardness of repeated references to "he
or she," and because I am often alluding to my own perceptions and experiences as a judge. Each suggestion is founded in some way on one or
more of the premises described in Part I. Many of the issues I touch

A good example is the body of doctrine pertaining to official and governmental immunity for tort liability. See Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 281.
" The phrase is taken from the title of Judge Coffin's book, F. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A
JUDGE (1980).
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upon have been topics of discussion among judges (and their critics) for
many years. My purpose is neither to summarize nor to settle those debates; my goal, rather, is to add something distinctive to them.
A.

The Judge as Monk

Many of the most articulate and influential descriptions of the ideal
judicial temperament conjoin two traits: aloofness or isolation from social
and political strife, and humility and self-abnegation in decisionmaking.
These two postures are not logically linked, but, in practice, they are almost always associated with one another.
The first of these attitudes has been eloquently stated by one of my
colleagues:
One given the power to render decisions in formal adjudicatory
proceedings is accorded the highest of honors and dealt the gravest of responsibilities; those who take on this judicial role may no
longer participate in the daily intercourse of life as freely as do
others. They have a duty to the judicial system in which they
have accepted membership fastidiously to safeguard their integrity-at the expense, if need be, of "neighbors, friends and acquaintances, business and social relations." This is their "part" in
their "day and generation," and one who is unwilling to make the
sacrifice is unsuited to the office. 55
As the foregoing passage suggests, the duty of a judge to remove himself
from the fray is most frequently-and most powerfully-justified on the
basis of his obligation to avoid, not only ex parte contacts with persons
interested in the disputes he must resolve, but even the "appearance of
impropriety. ' " But most judges who practice and preach this doctrine
are also attracted to the Olympian stance for deeper, personal reasons-impulses reflected in their tendency to disapprove of their colleagues' worldly ways even when such extrajudicial activities pose no risk
57
of exposure to undue influence.

65 Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d
547, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Robinson, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (footnotes omitted).
" See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1972).
For an insightful (albeit probably unique) illustration of the way in which a judge's
aloof posture can proceed more from character than from conviction, see Rogat, The Judge
as a Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 227-30, 243-48 (1964) (discussing Justice Holmes). A
quite different intertwining of overt fear of undue influence and deeper instincts and fears
is evident in Professor Jaffe's astute account of the foundation of Justice Frankfurter's
jurisprudence:

The administration of justice should embody conclusions rationally derived from
previously stated propositions. Why? Because the reach of the law must have predictable limits giving assurance that beyond those limits there is freedom to act,
to plan, to choose, without consequences dictated by fear of the imponderable
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An inspiring statement of the second of the two principles-the virtue
of self-abnegation-appears in Justice Frankfurter's letter to his brethren
on the occasion of his retirement:
My years on the Court have only deepened my conviction that
its existence and functioning according to its best historic traditions are indispensable for the well-being of the nation. The nature of the issues which are involved in the legal controversies
that are inevitable under our constitutional system does not warrant the nation to expect identity of views among the members of
the Court regarding such issues, nor even agreement on the routes
of thought by which decisions are reached. The nation is merely
warranted in expecting harmony of aims among those who have
been called to the Court. This means pertinacious pursuit of the
processes of Reason in the disposition of the controversies that
come before the Court. This presupposes intellectual disinterestedness in the analysis of the factors involved in the issues that
call for decision. This in turn requires rigorous self-scrutiny to
discover, with a view to curbing, every influence that may deflect
from such disinterestedness."
As Frankfurter's language suggests, the most common and compelling justification for the proposition that a judge should strive to suppress his
emotions and convictions is that his professional obligation is to decide
cases in accordance with the law, not his personal views, and that only by
constantly maintaining and cultivating a stance of intellectual humility
will he be capable of making fine, unbiased discriminations between
closely balanced legal arguments. As Frankfurter put the point in another
context:
[T]he only sure safeguard against crossing the line between adjudication and legislation is an alert recognition of the necessity not
to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained, reluctance to do
so ...

pressures of the moment. In such freedom the sense of security-so precarious, so
precious-can spread its wing. Underlying this and much else in the Justice's record is an intense concern to be free from pressures-pressures so multiplied, so
rankly thriving in the boundless demands for power of our time. We are presented
here with a profound temperamental response ...
Once we sense this emphasis 3n the balefulness of pressure, we have a clue to
many of Frankfurter's intensities.
Jaffe, The Judicial Universe of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 62 HAIv. L. Rv. 357, 408-09
(1949). See also Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 355-57 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing the essentiality of impartial judges).
'" Letter from Justice Frankfurter to his Brethren (Sept. 28, 1962), reprinted in 371
U.S. ix, x (emphasis added).
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. We cannot avoid what Mr. Justice Cardozo deemed in-

herent in the problem of construction, making "a choice between
uncertainties. We must be content to choose the lesser." But to
the careful and disinterested eye, the scales will hardly escape appearing to tip slightly on the side of a more probable meaning."
Here again, however, temperament often is as important as principled
conviction. Belief in the moral value of such humility, as much as belief
in its utility in facilitating responsible adjudication, explains its large and
estimable following in the appellate judiciary.60
My own view is that, if kept in perspective and confined to the contexts
in which they serve demonstrable functions, each of the foregoing two
principles is unexceptionable. But, if allowed to dominate a judge's lifestyle and personality, they are not only unnecessarily inhibitory, but destructive of his capacity for responsible decisionmaking. I am surely not
suggesting that a judge should put himself in a position where he is suspected of being susceptible to influence or that he should feel free, in
hard cases, to advert to his personal values rather than conscientiously
strive to weigh the competing legal arguments. What I am suggesting is
that, if he allows his healthy wariness of "the appearance of impropriety"
and "judicial legislation" to become phobias, an appellate judge reduces
rather than develops his capacity fairly and thoughtfully to resolve the
cases that come before him.
The destructive effect develops and is manifested as follows. When a
person is appointed to the bench, he inevitably has a distinctive worldview-a conception of the nature of American society and of his own
place within it, molded partly by his class background, partly by his individual history, partly by his reading and reflection. That world-view is
not static; throughout his life it has been evolving as he has learned more
about himself and his environment and as he has tested his ideas on

" Frankfurter, supra note 22, at 535, 544 (footnote omitted) (quoting Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 288 (1933)).
1* Cardozo's views on this subject were complex. At times he defended even more forcefully than Frankfurter the need for a judge to identify his personal predilections only in
order to rise above them. See, e.g., B. CARDOZO, supra note 4, at 172 ("Something of Pascal's spirit of self-search and self-reproach must come at moments to the man who finds
himself summoned to the duty of shaping the progress of the law."). However, his sense of
the impossibility of ever freeing oneself from one's heritage, personal background, sympathies, and loyalties, see id. at 166-67, of "transcend[ing] the limitations of the ego and
see[ingj anything as it really is," id. at 106, led him to be much less sanguine than the
Justice who succeeded him regarding the benefits to be gained from the pursuit of
"objectivity."
Holmes' renowned refusal to allow his personal convictions to affect his adjudication
seems to have derived, not from any belief in the moral value of self-abnegation, but from
the combination of his philosophical skepticism and his sense of the futility of resisting (or
even trying to channel) the will of the "masses." See Rogat, supra note 57, at 235-38, 249-

56.
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other people and concrete problems.
When he becomes a judge, the development of some aspects of that
world-view accelerate and intensify. Few lawyers, for example, have even
a moderately well-developed vision of the nature of our political system-and specifically of the scope of the power and duty of the judiciary
to oversee the activities of the other branches of government. A judge on
a federal court of appeals must have such a vision. The result is that a
new arrival on the bench commonly undergoes an intense period of reading and thinking when he confronts his first few constitutional cases.
The development of many other aspects of his world-view, however,
slows. Exactly why that happens remains something of a mystery to me,
but two factors seem most important. First, the channels through which
information about the world flows to a judge are fewer and narrower than
those that feed most people. A judge depends for his contemporary
knowledge principally on books, newspapers, television, and on conversations with his colleagues on the bench and with his law clerks. Above all,
a judge relies on the data churned up by the cases that come before him.
Compared to the more diverse sorts of contacts he was likely to have
maintained before coming on the bench, these modes of access to information are restricted and skewed.
Second, a judge has fewer opportunities than most people to test his
ideas against others. Excluding family and close friends, to almost everyone with whom he comes into daily contact-lawyers, clerks, and
staff-the judge is in a superior position. All too easily he comfortably
assumes the role of seer-or, worse yet, overseer. Very rarely is he obliged
to face the kinds of negative responses to his thoughts that people in
other professional positions confront constantly: skepticism, open hostility, disinterest, scorn. Speaking almost exclusively to receptive (and frequently captive) audiences, he is likely to acquire a complacent confidence in the accuracy of his view of things.
Devotion to the ideals of aloofness and self-abnegation exacerbates
these problems. The judge who senses danger-or impropriety-in extrajudicial meetings and activities naturally avoids such affairs. He declines
invitations to give speeches, teach seminars, participate in conferences,
and even to write articles. His world shrinks. Home and office, family and
cases bound his life. The vessels carrying to him vital information about
his changing environment become fewer and smaller. Unless he is diligent
about reading broadly to compensate for this effect, he is likely increasingly to conceive of his society as composed of persons of the sort who
figure in the background portions of his briefs and opinions.61 If, at the
same time, he sincerely devotes himself to cultivation of an instinctive

61 Cf. Note, The Changing Social Vision, supra note 50, at 722-25, 734-36 (accounting
for the evolution of Blackmun's world-view in part on the basis of the kinds of cases he has
seen and decided since he arrived at the Supreme Court).
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disinterestedness, his intellectual and emotional development will slow
even more. The judge whose life is his work at least has the opportunity
to use his cases as catalysts for reflection on the nature of his society and
polity-on the social problems that give rise to such controversies and on
the ways they might be alleviated. But to the judge who celebrates the
ideal of intellectual humility, such ruminations are to be avoided. Convictions and feeling on the issues implicated by cases only cloud one's vision,
reduce one's capacity to see which way the scales tip. They are to be
curbed, not developed.
The net effect of these two constraints will not only be unfortunate,
from a personal standpoint, but will hamper his decisionmaking. A
stunted, anachronistic, or warped world-view will hobble an appellate
judge in his work. Most importantly, it will reduce his ability responsibly
to decide "very hard" cases, of the sort described in Part I. Consider the
following perceptive account by Justice Traynor of a judge's duty when
confronted with a controversy of this order:
In. . . cases [of this kind] competing considerations are of such
closely matched strength as to create a dilemma. How can a judge
arrive at a decision one way or the other and yet avoid being arbitrary? If he has a high sense of judicial responsibility, he is loath
to make an arbitrary choice even of acceptably rational alternatives, for he would thus abdicate the responsibility of judgment
when it proved most difficult. He rejects coin-tossing, though it
would make a great show of neutrality. Then what?
He is painfully aware that a decision will not be saved from
being arbitrary merely because he is disinterested. He knows well
enough that one entrusted with decision, traditionally above base
prejudices, must also rise above the vanity of stubborn preconceptions, sometimes euphemistically called the courage of one's convictions. He knows well enough that he must severely discount his
own predilections, of however high grade he regards them, which
is to say he must bring to his intellectual labors a cleansing doubt
of his omniscience, indeed even of his perception. Disinterest,
however, even disinterest envisaged on a higher plane than the
emotional, is only the minimum qualification of a judge for his
job. Then what more?
He comes to realize how essential it is also that he be intellectually interested in a rational outcome. He cannot remain disoriented forever, his mind suspended between alternative passable
solutions. Rather than taking the easy way out via one or the
other, he can strive to deepen his inquiry and his reflection
enough to arrive at last at a value judgment as to what the law
ought to be and to spell out why. In the course of doing so he
channels his interest in a rational outcome into an interest in a
particular result. In that limited sense he becomes result oriented.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol32/iss3/4
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Would we want it otherwise? Would we give up the value judgment for the non-commitment of the two-faced coin? 69
The "restrained" judge, in the senses described above, will be at a severe disadvantage when he is compelled to make the necessary value
judgment in the "very hard" cases described by Judge Traynor. His general knowledge of human affairs and his systems of morals will often be
so limited as to be inadequate to the task. No judge is omniscient under
these circumstances, but the aloof, truly "disinterested" judge will be especially near-sighted.
I once suggested, with tongue in cheek, in a speech to the National
Academy of Arbitrators, that the life of a judge sometimes approaches
monasticism. I painted the celibate existence as follows:
As a judge, I am the beneficiary of life tenure and a guaranteed
pension, in return for which I am required to perform in a hot
robe, write long opinions with numerous footnotes, speak to no
one about my work (save my judicial colleagues and my law
clerks), avoid political issues, and make routine public disclosures
of all of my associations and earnings. In a sense, being a judge is
like being imprisoned in a cage with steel bars in the middle of
Times Square in New York City. You can see and hear all that is
happening around you, but your participation in those events is
seriously circumscribed. 8
Although my remarks were given in jest, the portrayal is an all-too-familiar stereotype of a judge.
My real view on these matters, as should by now be obvious, is that an
appellate judge has not only the right, but the duty to involve himself in
the world. If he is to continue developing as a person after he comes on
the bench-and if he is to decide cases as well as he is able-he should
maintain a diverse group of friends, travel widely, give speeches (that do
not engage political disputes or improperly pertain to matters before the
court), and seek out opportunities for exchanges of ideas. I believe that
these things can be done easily without a judge infringing his responsibility to insure honest, fair and thorough treatment of the cases before the
court, and also without any "appearances of impropriety."
While a judge typically will not need to resort to personal beliefs in
deciding cases, some consideration of these beliefs may be unavoidable in
the occasional "very hard" case where the legal arguments are indeterminate. In such a case, a judge's informed and critical development of his
beliefs is a prerequisite to intelligent resolution of the dispute. Further, in
all cases, the nature of one's personal beliefs should be consciously, rather
Traynor, supra note 5, at 234 (footnotes omitted).
Edwards, Advantages of Arbitration Over Litigation:Reflections of a Judge, 35
AcAD. ARB. PROC. 16, 17 (1983).
"

e8
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than subconsciously, recognized. The likelihood of such recognition occurring will be heightened when a judge remains intellectually active and
aware of the world around him. In other words, a judge who openly seeks
legitimate exchanges of ideas, and thereby continues to cultivate personal
beliefs, is in a good position tc evaluate and minimize the influence of
such beliefs in most cases. The real threat that a judge's personal ideologies may affect his decisions in an inappropriate case arises when the
judge is not even consciously aware of the potential threat.
To summarize, if asked to capture in a phrase my sense of the posture
a judge should assume vis-A-vis the worlds of politics, ideas, and affairs, I
would look not to Henry James or Henry Adams, 64 but to Walt Whitman:
5
"Both in and out of the game, and watching and wondering at it."
B.

"Focused" Versus "Wide-Angle" Adjudication
1. Introduction

One of the most sacred tenets of appellate decisionmaking in the
United States is that, in rendering an opinion, a court should reach only
those issues essential to the resolution of the case before it and should
discuss those issues only to the extent necessary to dispose of the matter.
The principles on which the foregoing injunction is founded are basically
mandated. Federal courts may decide only
sound, even constitutionally
"cases and controversies"; 66 they lack the power to issue wholly advisory
opinions.6 7 The advantages to well-informed decisionmaking gained by
hearing the arguments of parties, each of whom has a significant stake in
a live controversy, properly prompts courts to decline to pass upon disputes that have become moot or in which one of the disputants has only a
tenuous interest." And similar considerations make courts reluctant to
reach issues not briefed by the parties. 6" The net result of these considerations is that we have a tradition of focused adjudication in the United
States.
For the most part, I am a strong disciple of focused adjudication and
see no good reasons to challenge its traditional application. Nevertheless,
there is a highly naive and mythical quality to any suggestion that focused adjudication is or should be the sole method of appellate decision-

" Cf. Rogat, supra note 57, at 230-43 (drawing somewhat strained parallels among the
sensibilities of James, Adams, and Holmes).

15 Leaves of Grass (1855), reprinted in W.
30 (1982).
U.S. CONST. art. III.

WHITMAN, COMPLETE POETRY AND COLLECTED

PROSE

6 E.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911).
See, e.g., North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (per curiam).
" But see H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 38-39 (1967) (discussing why, as a practical matter, consideration of issues that have been briefed inadequately if at all is often
unavoidable).
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making. It should, I believe, be the predominant method; however, in certain narrow categories of cases, this presumed tradition should give way
to what I call "wide-angle adjudication."
Before proceeding with my thesis, I should stress that what I have to
say does not reflect a novel idea. Indeed, I believe that appellate judges,
for many years now, have indulged a practice of wide-angle adjudication
on appropriate occasions, while simultaneously proclaiming the inviolate
virtues of focused adjudication. My mission in this part of the article,
therefore, will be to rationalize and justify an existing form of appellate
decisionmaking that I find perfectly appropriate in certain limited
circumstances.
2. The Tradition of "Focused Adjudication"
In an article published a year after Justice Cardozo's death, Professor
Corbin described Cardozo's method of common law adjudication as
follows:
It cannot be said that he made any extensive changes in the existing law of contract. To state the facts of the cases, the decision,
and the reasoning of his opinion will not show the overthrow of
old doctrine or the establishment of new. Instead, it will show the
application of existing doctrines with wisdom and discretion; an
application that does not leave those doctrines wholly unaffected,
but one that carries on their evolution as is reasonably required
by the new facts before the court. When Cardozo is through, the
law is not exactly as it was before; but there has been no sudden
shift or revolutionary change ....70
Eighteen years earlier, Cardozo himself had described in similar terms
the approach he thought proper: "[The] work of [judicial] modification
[of the law] is gradual. It goes on inch by inch. Its effects must be measured by decades and even centuries. Thus measured, they are seen to
have behind them the power and the pressure of the moving glacier. '' 7 ,
Implicit in the foregoing passages is a conception of focused adjudication that continues to influence powerfully the habits of the federal judiciary. Corbin and Cardozo were referring specifically to common law adjudication, but the theory they invoke also strongly affects our
conceptions of how statutory and constitutional interpretation should be
conducted.
At the risk of oversimplification, I suggest that the focused adjudication model is founded on two tenets. First, when deciding an appeal, a
judge should confine his attention, for the most part, to the case before
70 Corbin, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Contracts,52 HARV. L.
(1939).
7' B. CARDOZO, supra note 4, at 25.
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him and to the issues fairly presented. This is not to say that he should
not consider the effect of his ruling on future litigants; of course he
should. But his principal goal should not be enunciation of a standard to
guide other parties; it should be to decide the questions actually raised by
the appeal (not questions that he wishes were raised by the appeal).
Moreover, to the extent that his answers depend on the potential longrun impact of alternative solutions, the judge's assessment of those effects
should derive from reflection on and extrapolation of what he has learned
from the behavior of the parties in the case before him, not from "legislative" inquiry into the field of social or economic life that is affected by
the legal norm in question.
Second, if the judge decides that the applicable law should be modified
or limited, he should alter it no more than is necessary to respond to the
instant case. Change, in other words, should be incremental. An unwise
doctrine should not be exploded but should gradually be eroded as a result of courts' refusals to adhere to or reaffirm particular facets of it when
those facets are challenged in specific cases. A wise doctrine should flower
through the accretion of extensions made by courts in recognition of the
utility of applying the doctrine in novel situations.
Much wisdom underlies these two principles just described. The
method founded on them-i.e., focused adjudication-has certainly
proven its merits in the past. Some of our greatest judges have been eloquent defenders and successful practitioners of it.7' And we are frequently reminded of the dangers of unnecessary or unthinking departures
from it."3
As I have already indicated, I do not doubt the wisdom of this tradition. Modern federal appellate adjudication, however, consisting of an
enormously expanding caseload and broader applications of statutory and
administrative rules, sometimes calls for different ways of doing business.
One alternative approach, which I have called "wide-angle adjudication,"
is the principal topic of this section.
3.

"Principled" Adjudication

Before turning to an analysis and defense of that method, I pause
briefly to consider a related matter. A proposition with which even unyielding devotees of the focused method would agree is that an appellate
judge should not think of himself as a "present-day Chancellor, whose job

71

In addition to Cardozo, I think particularly of Justice Harlan and Judge Learned

Hand.
73 See, e.g., Dershowitz & Ely, Comment, Harrisv. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 120508, 1205 n.40 (1971) (discussing danger of deciding broad constitutional questions when narrower ground for decision is available).
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'
Rather, his duty
[is] to secure fairness and equity in individual cases."74
is to decide cases on the basis of general principles-principles he would
be willing to apply to all cases that come within their scope, regardless of
the attractiveness or unattractiveness of the parties who benefit and lose
thereby. That adjudication should be principled, in this minimal sense,
rather than ad hoc, I take to be sufficiently clear as not to require demonstration here.7 6 I mention it only to note that I think it is beyond serious
dispute and consequently may be taken for granted in the ensuing
discussion.

4.

"Wide-Angle Adjudication" and its Application

The issue that interests me is not whether cases should be decided on
the basis of general principles, but how those principles should be developed and applied. In the vast majority of cases, I should reiterate, the
focused approach suffices. In a few contexts, however, adherence to that
method gives rise to a distorted vision of a legal problem, and ultimately
leads to the creation or perpetuation of an incoherent or inadequate system of doctrine.
The argument in favor of this proposal is perhaps best begun by identifying some of the contexts I have in mind. Generally speaking, there are
probably three major circumstances when a judge does, and properly
should, consider wide-angle adjudication. First, there are cases involving
specific types of recurringproblems.7 In such cases, the court recognizes
that, because there is the potential of a flood of litigation absent some
general statements of principle to guide those who might be litigants in
the future, it would be a waste of precious judicial resources to indulge a
case-by-case method of adjudication fully.
Second, there are cases in which wide-angle adjudication may be fully
dispositive of a potentially enormous problem that is not well-suited for
resolution through further litigation. 77 An example of such a situation is
Franz v. United Statess7 8 involving a challenge to the administration of

71 See Schwartz, Felix Frankfurterand Earl Warren: A Study of a DeterioratingRelationship, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 115, 124 (describing the jurisprudence of Chief Justice Warren
in these terms). See also G. WHrrE, EARL WARREN 359-67 (1982) (elaborating upon Warren's "ethicism").
" The classic explication and defense of the proposition is Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). For an interesting effort to
apply the same general injunction to administrative decisionmaking, see Wright, Beyond
DiscretionaryJustice, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972).
7' See, e.g., Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (attorneys' fees); National

Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (attorneys' fees).
77 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, __
U.S. -,
103 S. Ct. 1197 (1983).
78 707 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir.), supplemented, 712 F.2d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1984

29

CLEVELAND

STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:385

the federal Witness Protection Program. 79 In Franz, federal officials relocated and changed the identities of a government informant, his wife, and
her three children by a former marriage, in return for the informant's
testimony against alleged leaders of organized crime. Unfortunately, the
procedure had the effect of severing the ongoing relationship between the
children and their natural father. The father sued and the opinion for the
court resulted in an exhaustive treatment of a number of very difficult
statutory and constitutional issues. The closing lines of the court's opinion, however, make clear the purpose of the wide-angle decisionmaking
that had been employed:
As to the propriety and utility of pressing onward in litigation,
we venture our opinion that ultimate resolution of this controversy by a court may not be the ideal solution for any of the parties. As the disputants conceded at the outset, this case involves a
conflict between several powerful, legitimate interests. Guided by
the foregoing clarification of their respective claims, the parties
are likely to be better able than a judge to work out an arrangement for reconciling-or at least compromising between-their
various needs and desires."0
Third, there are cases that, by their nature and the timing of their
presentation, allow for thorough clarificationsof existing case law or detailed statements in anticipation of future case problems." Although
this category has some inherent ambiguity, it includes cases that require
reconciliation of existing precedent and other cases that alert a judge to
prospective difficulties resulting from doctrinal uncertainties. In cases of
this sort, judges often rely on what can best be described as an intuitive
sense in writing an opinion more broadly than necessary to decide the
particular case at hand in order to give guidance and fend off problems in
future litigation. Such judicial reflections are hazardous business and
there are as many cases in which the judges' efforts at wide-angle adjudication have been disastrous as helpful. Nonetheless, in appropriate cases,
even this third approach has its place.
Responsible resolution of cases arising out of the foregoing contexts, I
have found, requires departure from the usual focused mode of adjudication in three respects. First, a judge must cast his analytical net unusually
wide. He must make an especially conscious effort to consider hypothetical situations that might be covered by the various possible solutions

" See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 501-504, 84 Stat.
922, 933-94, reprinted in 18 U.S.C. prec. § 3481 (1976).
o 707 F.2d at 610.
See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171 (1967); Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1983); McGehee v. CIA, 697 F.2d
1095 (D.C. Cir.), modified on reh'g, 711 F.2d 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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under review, and to assess the desirability of each option as applied to
those situations as well as to cases more closely resembling the one before
him. Second, to predict as best as he is able what would be the practical
effect of each doctrinal option in the arena thus broadly defined, he must
undertake a research effort much more expansive than that appropriate
in the usual appeal. On the basis of these two inquiries, the judge must
then strive to formulate, not just a rule capable of resolving the appeal at
hand, but a set of general principles or standards that will guide both
private parties when their activities bring them
within one of these zones
82
and lower courts when deciding novel cases.
In some instances, the outcome of an investigation of this sort is drastic
alteration of an area of the law. 83 In others, it is merely a straightening of
the doctrinal fabric. 8 4 In still others, the hope is that future litigation will
be foreclosed.8s Generally, however, judges employing wide-angle decisionmaking hope that it will make possible more consistent and predictable decisionmaking in future cases, along lines that more effectually promote the policies or principles that underlie the field.
The method just described is vulnerable to three kinds of criticism. To
each objection there is at least a partial response, and the nature of those
responses clarifies both the method itself and the kinds of circumstances
to which it is fairly applicable.
The first criticism is that judges lack the information-and, more importantly, the means of access to the information-necessary to under-

82 See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949), where the
dissenting Justice Frankfurter stated:
Case-by-case adjudication gives to the judicial process the impact of actuality and
thereby saves it from the hazards of generalizations insufficiently nourished by
experience. There is, however, an attendant weakness to a system that purports to
pass merely on what are deemed to be the particular circumstances of a case. Consciously or unconsciously the pronouncements in an opinion too often exceed the
justification of the circumstances on which they are based, or, contrariwise, judicial preoccupation with the claims of the immediate leads to a succession of ad
hoc determinations making for eventual confusion and conflict. There comes a
time when the general considerations underlying each specific situation must be
exposed in order to bring the too unruly instances into more fruitful harmony.
Id. at 705-06. For an implicit argument in favor of this approach, see Hazard, supra note 11,
at 11.
83 A good example is the creation of the modern doctrine of products liability. See generally G.

WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION

292-316 (1976).

" See, e.g., P. Freund, Felix Frankfurter: Reminiscences and Reflections 11 (Nov. 19,
1982) (unpublished manuscript): "Some of Frankfurter's most memorable decisions were in
the nature of rationalizing-re-examining and re-ordering-areas of the law that, in his
view, could no longer be satisfactorily patched up, but needed to be reconsidered more fundamentally. . . ." (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U.S. 682, 705 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307
U.S. 125 (1939)).
88 See, e.g., Franz, 707 F.2d at 610.
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take expansive projects of this sort. Adjudication, as has often been observed, is episodic; a given case is likely to implicate, and therefore
illuminate, only parts of a field of doctrine. Moreover, the nature of the
judicial process restricts and frequently skews the flow to the court even
of data directly relevant to the questions presented; as Frankfurter once
observed, judges are dependent "upon evidence and information limited
by the narrow rules of litigation, shaped and intellectually influenced by
the fortuitous choice of particular counsel.""6 When they attempt to fill
the informational gaps left by the parties, to develop a data base necessary to support a thoroughgoing inquiry into the practicability of alternative doctrinal systems, courts run a high risk of error. Few judges are
economists or sociologists; even fewer have the time or inclination to undertake extensive research efforts. Without the aid of expert advisors,
guiding their research and testing their assumptions and conclusions, it
may be argued that the courts are as likely to distort a field as to remap
or revamp it. 7 In view of all these handicaps and dangers, so it is argued,
courts are better advised to confine themselves to their proper task: deciding the questions asked of them on the basis of the information the
parties provide them.
This potent line of argument invites a variety of responses. First, to the
extent that the objection contrasts wide-angle adjudication, which requires considerable independent research and analysis, with ordinary appellate adjudication, in which the courts can and should rely solely on the
parties' submissions, it is clearly mistaken. In only a small proportion of
the "hard" and "very hard" cases that come before us is the quality of
the advocacy sufficiently high and the material submitted by the parties
sufficiently comprehensive that we need go no further to decide the questions presented. In a large majority of cases raising significant, seriously
disputed legal issues, judges must go beyond the briefs and appendices,
explore secondary sources and statutory and case law in related fields, to
educate themselves regarding the relevant competing considerations.88 In
short, the first response to the institutional-competence argument is: We
do it all the time.
I concede that this first-level answer is far from decisive; the kind of
inquiry necessitated by wide-angle adjudication is at least quantitatively,
if not qualitatively, different from that entailed by the usual appeal, and
the risks of error attendant upon the former are significantly greater.
Those risks can, however, be reduced in two ways. First, a judge should
always start with a strong presumption in favor of focused decisionmak86 Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 234
(1955). Frankfurter was referring specifically to constitutional adjudication, but his comment is equally applicable to other kinds of complex appeals.
867
See generally Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the
Flow of Information to the Justices: A PreliminaryInquiry 61 VA. L. REV. 1187 (1975).
" See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 69, at 38-39; Traynor, supra note 5, at 235-36.
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ing. This will serve to limit the number of cases in which wide-angle adjudication is used and guarantee that the alternative approach will be followed only after deliberate choice. Second, a court may be advised to hold
off for some period of time before undertaking a wide-angle investigation.
Thus, for example, it is frequently desirable for a court of appeals to refrain, for a few years, from trying to make sense of a new and complex
statute-to confine its attention for that period to specific questions
raised on appeal and to allow the lower courts to explore many separate
facets of the act in question. By the time it undertakes to put the pieces
together, the court of appeals will have the benefit, not only of a range of
concrete illustrations of the ways in which the statute does or might operate, but also of a variety of views regarding the proper shape of the field
as a whole. 9
It must be admitted, however, that even the aforementioned devices
will not eliminate the risks generated by the deficiencies in judges' expertise and access to information. But the residual dangers inherent in wideangle adjudication can be substantially alleviated simply by acknowledging them. By that I mean that, when a judge writes an opinion describing
the outcome of a wide-ranging inquiry, he should explicitly indicate
which conclusions are firm, which are tentative, and which are highly
speculative.90 In so doing, he will encourage other courts, when confronting future cases arising on the outskirts of the terrain he has
mapped, to reexamine a portion of the field and, if necessary, to rechart
it.
The second objection that might be made to the method described
above is that it is likely to generate intercircuit conflicts. Different courts
of appeals are likely to see a field of doctrine somewhat differently, and

"

See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960), where

the author states:
What our study shows . . . is (1) that a court ought always to be slow in uncharted territory, and, in such territory, ought to be narrow, again and again, in
any ground for decision. Until the territory has been reasonably explored. But
what our study shows is (2) that once there is clearish light, a court should make
effort to state an ever broader line for guidance. And (3) so long as each line is
promptly and overtly checked up and checked on and at need rephrased on each
subsequent occasion of new illumination, such informed questing after broader
lines is of the essence of good appellate judging.
Id. at 389.
For a recent effort to apply this approach, see Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
" See, e.g., Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 603-10 (D.C. Cir.), supplemented, 712
F.2d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1983); McGhee v. CIA, 697 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir.), modified on reh'g,
711 F.2d 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Arguably, the judge need not say anything to achieve this
effect because subsequent courts will discount as dictum all conclusions inessential to the
original decision. Nevertheless, re-examination of his conclusions (particularly by lower
courts) will be more likely (and will be more sensitive) if he expressly indicates the degree of
confidence he has in each of his conclusions and prescriptions.
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few will be eager to adopt, in toto, another's comprehensive scheme.
Thus, if more than one circuit court subjects a given area of the law to
the kind of comprehensive analysis I have described, the result is likely to
be significant divergence in the doctrinal systems in force in different
jurisdictions.9 '
The response to this familiar argument is: What would be so bad about
that? The resultant tension in federal law is likely to be no more acute
than the kind of interstitial incoherence that results from persistent application of the focused approach. And the long-term effects of such overt
conflict between the doctrinal systems in force in different circuits is
likely to be beneficial. If one system proves demonstrably superior in
practice, the circuits using different approaches are likely eventually to
come around."3 And, at a minimum, the resultant testing of alternative
comprehensive schemes will provide the Supreme Court with valuable information if and when it ultimately decides to resolve the conflict.
The third objection is that wide-angle adjudication, particularly if it
results in significant restructuring of a field of law, constitutes judicial
legislation, and, as such, is undesirable for two reasons. First, it results in
imposition on society of the distinctive ideology of the appellate judiciary.
Second, by removing from the control of the legislature a significant portion of the legal order, it inhibits and, in 9the
long run, stunts vigorous,
3
participational, democratic political action.
To this (also familiar) argument, there are three responses. First, as
shown in Part I, in a small but significant category of cases, exercise of
judicial discretion is inevitable; wide-angle judicial decisions are thus certainly not unique in resting, to some extent, on the values of the decisionmakers. Second, the percentage of cases, arising in a given field, that
present "very hard" questions and thus that require exercises of discretion is almost always reduced by a wide-angle decision; institution of a
comprehensive decision generally strengthens the "constraints" imposed
on judges who decide cases that arise subsequently. The resultant advantages-particularly in terms of the consistency and predictability of decisionmaking in the field-substantially offset the disadvantages associated

" Compare NRDC v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1983) (in applying Equal Access to
Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1976), court should look to agency position that necessi-

tated law suit to determine whether "the position of the United States was substantially
justified," 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1976)), with Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 546-557
(D.C. Cir. 1983) ("position of the United States" refers to the arguments relied upon by the
government in litigation).
92 Cf. Wilkinson, Justice John M. Harlan and the Values of Federalism 57 VA. L. REv.
1185, 1193 (1971) (discussing Justice Harlan's theory of the desirability of allowing states to
"experiment" with alternative doctrinal schemes).
93 See, e.g., Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HAsv. L. REV.
217, 229 (1955); Wilkinson, supra note 92. Cf. Mikva, The Courts and Politics: When They
Mix and When They Don't, 14 BARRISTERS 345 (1979) (suggesting that some judicial action
will trigger populist responses).
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with the fact that the ways in which those decisions are made are controlled, to some extent, by the values of the authors of the original decision. Finally, a wide-angle decision frequently stimulates, rather than
aborts, democratic political action. As long as the decision is not founded
on the Constitution, it is subject to revision by the legislature. Reduction
of a chaotic field of the law to a comprehensible form often facilitates,
rather than discourages, assessment and restructuring of the law by the
representatives of the people."'
One final observation on this general subject: To maximize the benefits
of this method of appellate adjudication and to reduce as much as possible the residual force of the foregoing three objections, it is essential that
a court explain .its decision as fully, clearly, and precisely as it is able.
This is not to say that the court should attempt to describe faithfully how
it thought about and decided the case; as Dewey observed long ago, "[t] he
logic of exposition is different from that of search and inquiry.' 9 5 What is
required, rather, is an ordered, well-modulated assessment of all the competing considerations that undergird the court's prescriptions in their final form.
Such a full exposition of the basis of a decision serves two functions.
First, it provides essential guidance to lower courts confronted with cases
not covered by the explicit prescriptions in the opinion." Second, it compels judges employing the wide-angle method both to "think out" all the
various implications of their actions as fully and as carefully as possible
and to accept responsibility for their judgments and choices.97 A requirement of full exposition also has a practical effect of ensuring that wideangle decisionmaking will be employed only infrequently. Judges simply

" In some cases, admittedly, this generalization does not hold. Particularly if there is a
legislative or popular movement afoot to alter the doctrine in question, sensitivity to the
need to defer to and cultivate participational political activity should prompt a court to
refrain from attempting to synthesize the field. This complex of concerns is discussed more
comprehensively infra in Part III.B.
95 Dewey, supra note 5, at 24. See also H. FRIENDLY, supra note 69, at 37;

K.

LLEWELLYN,

supra note 89, at 56:

Of course, only by happenstance will an opinion accurately report the process of
deciding. Indeed, I urge flatly that such a report is not really a function of the
opinion at all, though if the court so chooses there is no impropriety in recording
such significant portions of the work as doubt, long pondering, independent research, any published source of illumination, division within the college, and the
like.
See Jaffe, The Supreme Court, 1950 Term, 65 HARV. L. REv. 107, 112 (1951); Sacks,
The Supreme Court, 1953 Term, 68 HARV. L. REv. 96, 103 (1954). But see Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
"7See Cohen, supra note 6, at 812. Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395-96 (1978)
(Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 259-60 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring in the result) (both arguing that frank acknowledgment of the true
basis of a constitutional provision [viz. substantive due process] is more conducive to rational decisionmaking).
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do not have the time, given existing caseloads and their desire for expeditious case processing, to use a wide-angle approach very often. This is
reassuring: our tradition of focused adjudication is salutary and it should,
except in the narrow and compelling circumstances indicated above, continue to remain predominant.
C.

Collegiality

Some persons who are not directly and intimately involved with the
work of the judiciary have a badly distorted view of the courts of appeals.
This view perceives a circuit court as consisting of a group of judges who
are woefully lacking in collegiality, divided into distressingly stable
"blocs" (sometimes defined in terms of political orientation), and encumbered by networks of personal animosities that are nurtured by incessant
sniping and bickering. According to this view, the net result is that far too
often, judges are reluctant openly to discuss cases with one another. The
desire not to confer a tactical advantage on "the opposition" is seen to
overbalance the desire to air and test out one's ideas.
This view is, as I first suggested, grossly distorted. Nonetheless, there
are bits and pieces of the picture that will ring true in every circuit. Most
appellate judges are seasoned, independent professionals. They have an
office staff to oversee, an enormous amount of reading and writing to
complete, large caseloads to manage, and various outside commitments
(such as speeches, bar association meetings, judicial conferences and moot
court competitions) to keep them occupied. In short, they suffer from incredibly busy schedules, and leisure time with colleagues thus comes at a
premium. A difficult case, in the midst of busy schedules, may easily fray
the nerves of even the most patient judges who are struggling to find the
right answer.
Most of us wish it were not so. We wish we could speak more often and
freely with our colleagues-try out tentative lines of thought, debate the
relevance of analogous hypothetical situations, speculate on the way a
doctrine would more sensibly be organized. But we often lack the time,
and maybe even the collective will, to change the situation.
To determine if that will should be summoned, we need to examine
more carefully the roots of our sentiments. To a large extent, our longing
for greater collegiality derives simply from our desire to get along with
the people with whom we work, to achieve a less tension-riddled atmosphere around the courthouse. But, to some extent, our attitude is also
founded on a suspicion that we would all do our jobs better if we were
more frank and cooperative in dealing with one another.
I share the aforementioned suspicion but have found that justifying it
is more difficult than would first appear. The explanation that springs
most quickly to mind is that, if we talked more and more openly about
cases, we would somehow temper each other's more extreme ideas. Certainly that is the theory most frequently mentioned in the literature on
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol32/iss3/4
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the subject. Cardozo, for example, speaks in terms of "averaging":
It has been said that "History, like mathematics, is obliged to assume that eccentricities more or less balance each other, so that
something remains constant at last." The like is true of the work
of courts. The eccentricities of judges balance one another. One
judge looks at problems from the point of view of history, another
from that of philosophy, another from that of social utility, one is
a formalist, another a latitudinarian, one is timorous of change,
another dissatisfied with the present; out of the attrition of diverse minds there is beaten something which has a constancy and
uniformity and average value greater than its component
elements.98
Professor Hart seems to have had something similar in his mind when he
coined the phrase "the maturing of collective thought."99 Hart and his
followers appear to have believed that somehow, if judges talked openly
and long enough about hard issues, they would not only come to agreement, but their consensus would match the prevailing values of the society at large.100
All this seems to me highly implausible. Leaving aside the difficulty of
ascertaining the values prevailing in American society at any given time
and the unlikelihood that federal appellate judges could or would mold
their beliefs to fit those values,10 1 it seems to me very doubtful that the
diverse responses of a group of three (or more) judges to a hard case
would ever meld in the fashion described, no matter how long they
talked. The reason is not (or not usually) because we are stubborn and
refuse to abandon positions once we have taken them. 10 2 The reason,
rather, is that most of our disagreements in "hard" and, especially, "very
hard" cases derive from the fact that we hold very different views on the
social, political or moral issues implicated by such cases, views that color
the way we read the pertinent legal materials-views that are not likely
to dissolve when exposed to the solvents of criticism and argument.
Of course, averaging of a sort occurs frequently in the decisionmaking

B. CARDOZO, supra note 4, at 176-77 (footnote omitted).
91 Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices,
73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 100 (1959).
'00 See White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: JurisprudentialCriticism and
Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 287-88 (1973).
'o' See supra text accompanying note 45.
30' This was Judge Arnold's theory. Referring to Hart's notion of "the maturing of collec98

tive thought," see supra text accompanying note 99, he argued: "There is no such process as
this, and there never has been; men of positive views are only hardened in those views by
such conferences." Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1298, 1312 (1960).
For a not-altogether-persuasive rebuttal, see Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959
Term-Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV.
L. REV. 81, 85 (1960).
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process. For one thing, we adhere to the conventions discussed in
Part I.A.3. We also very often make compromises in order to achieve
unanimity in cases and thereby to make possible issuance of opinions that
will be of some use to private parties and lower courts in the future. But
such compromises do not always reflect underlying agreement on all portions of an opinion. And, as far as I can tell, compromises are only occasionally facilitated significantly by full and frank discussion of the issues
involved.
In short, if collegiality improves appellate adjudication, it must do so in
some way other than promoting consensus. My view is that the most important advantage gained by thoroughly "talking out" cases with one's
colleagues is that each judge is able, thereby, to refine his views. On rare
occasions, such a discussion amongst the members of a three-judge panel
prompts one of the judges to see the error of his ways and come around to
a view held by one or both of the other two. Somewhat more often, a
judge will be led significantly to shift his stance, but not to agree with the
others. But by far the most common-and, in my opinion, beneficial-result is that each judge comes away with a more sophisticated and
modulated sense of the case. This effect is most pronounced in cases that
depend significantly on the practicability of alternative solutions; nothing
is better than an argument with a skeptical colleague to hone one's understanding of what set of rules works best in practice in a given situation.
But in almost any complex case the effect is noticeable.
The dynamic just described seems to me demonstrable and important
enough to warrant making a concerted effort to improve our relations
with one another. This is especially true when we anticipate engaging in
what I have described as "wide-angle adjudication."'1 0 3 The complexity of
the issues raised in such cases and the large role typically played by considerations of practicability make us even more dependent than usual on
free-wheeling exchanges with one another for the essential fine-tuning of
our views.
D.

Expeditiousness

My last proposal has to do with the speed of case processing. I firmly
believe that judges must decide cases faster, and I am dismayed by the
time delays that many litigants face in case processing in the courts of
appeals. The problem is complex, however, because speed in case processing is only one of several equally important goals of the courts. No one
would responsibly urge speed at the 'direct expense of quality adjudication and certain cases (because of their complexity and importance) take
time to decide. Nonetheless, I have found that there are too many appeals
that simply languish in the courts long after the time when an opinion

los

See supra Part II.B.
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reasonably should have been issued. It is this reality that I find
troublesome.
During the year ending June 1983, statistics on case dispositions in the
District of Columbia Circuit indicated the following:
Median time from the
"Notice of Appeal" to
Median time from the
oral argument to final

filing of
final disposition
date of
disposition

10.8 months
2.1 months

These figures are not patently unreasonable, but they are misleading. In
order to appreciate the problem of delay to which I refer, it is important
to recall that approximately fifty percent of all appeals are decided by
order and without a full opinion.10" This means that a median figure of
nearly two months as the time required to dispose of an appeal after oral
argument is hardly impressive. Hidden beneath this statistic is the reality
that too many case dispositions are delayed for over a year (and some for
nearly two years!) before an opinion is issued after oral argument. Excluding en banc dispositions, I have yet to see or hear of a case that a
court of appeals was justified in spending more than a year to resolve.
Expeditious case processing is especially important in criminal cases
and in circumstances in which some important governmental action is
under challenge. But even more "ordinary" appeals deserve prompt attention and resolution. Promoting repose, preserving (or restoring) citizens' confidence in the courts, relieving the often acute financial distress
an injured party must endure before receiving recompense-the considerations are familiar; we need to remind ourselves of their importance." 5
Note that I am not suggesting that we decide more appeals; the complex issue of the proper size of our caseload is in no way implicated by my
proposal. I am simply suggesting that we decide cases as soon as possible
after they come in. Admittedly, some extra work may be required to get
ourselves in a position from which we are capable of implementing such a
Edwards, supra note 2, at 894.
"o

Professor Tribe observes:

[I]f court backlogs grow at their present rate, our children may not be able to
bring a lawsuit to a conclusion within their lifetime. Legal claims might then be
willed on, generation to generation, like hillbilly feuds; and the burdens of pressing them would be contracted like a hereditary disease. Resort to law would be the
nightmare described by Dickens in Bleak House-a dismal rite that "so exhausts
finances, patience, courage, hope, so overthrows the brain and breaks the heart,
that there is not an honorable [lawyer] who would not give-who does not often
give-the warning, 'Suffer any wrong that can be done you rather than come
here!'
Tribe, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice, ATLANrc, July 1979, at 29. Such a state of affairs
undoubtedly will never come to pass, but Tribe's comment is illuminating insofar as it suggests the ways in which most non-lawyers already feel when faced with the prospect of federal litigation.
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policy. But once a court is "caught up," it would need to do little more
than what is being done at present to stay current. In my view, it is our
duty to make the necessary effort-to reduce the degree to which justice
is now being delayed.
At present, there are some serious obstacles to improvements in case
processing. Certain obstacles, such as expanding caseloads, inadequate
appropriations for judges' salaries, support staff appointments and
purchases of necessary equipment (such as word processing machines),
inadequate advocacy, excessive brief filings, and a proliferation in petitions for rehearing, are beyond the direct control of the judges. Other
obstacles, however, such as excessively long opinions (with too many
string citations), prolix concurring and dissenting opinions, and inefficient uses of available advanced technology, are subject to remedy. I have
come to believe, for example, that judges sometimes misuse certain technological devices such as LEXIS and Westlaw (causing extended delays
in research and opinion writing); I have also thought that, because of ignorance as to what is available and how it might be employed, we fail to
make adequate use of advanced computer technologies that might expedite the work of the court.
It may be that the sheer press of business will force a resolution of the
expeditiousness problem. This may happen in a number of ways, however. To the extent possible, I think that it would be preferable for judges
to get their own houses in order so as to avoid the imposition of arbitrary
solutions from without.

III.

"FIT LEGISLATION":106

A

PLEA FOR PRECISION AND COOPERATION

My principal concern in this article has been what my colleagues and I
do and how we might do it better. We are not, however, masters of our
activities and destinies; the kinds of cases we confront, and how we are
able to handle them, are substantially controlled by Congress. Accordingly, it seems appropriate to close with a few comments regarding how
Congress might assist us to do our jobs better.
A.

FacilitatingStatutory Interpretation

The more precise and coherent a statute, the less it permits and requires creative judicial interpretation. That simple principle has been in
the public domain for a long time,10 7 but never has the judiciary felt its
force more than today. We are choking, not on statutes in general, 08 but

104

The language is borrowed from Frankfurter, supra note 22, at 545.

107

See, e.g., id. at 528-29.

,08 This is Professor Calabresi's thesis. See G.
STATUTES

CALABRESI,

A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF

1-7 (1982).
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on ambiguous and internally inconsistent statutes. ' To cite an example,
one of the deformities in the Civil Service Reform Act, ° resulting from
the political struggle that attended the birth of the statute, is the incoherence of the provisions pertaining to standards of review. One possible
reading of the Act would require reviewing courts to defer to the considered judgment of the Merit Systems Protection Board which, in turn,
must defer to public employer judgments that are subject to challenge
under the Act. The net result would be to allow federal employers virtually unlimited freedom of action in disciplining employees-a result patently inconsistent with the thrust of the Act as a whole."' Another illustration: the Equal Access to Justice Act, 1 2 passed in 1980, drastically
alters the ability of civil litigants to recover attorneys' fees against the
United States. The statute was passed only after a long struggle between
defenders of the interests of small businessmen (who wanted a generous
statute), various public interest organizations (most of whom wanted a
restrictive statute), and representatives of several federal agencies (who
advocated a restrictive statute in order not to inhibit their legitimate enforcement efforts or financially overburden their departments). The result is that the Act is riddled with ambiguous phrases. For instance, the
government's liability for fees is made to depend, in most cases, on
whether its "position" was "substantially justified," but the Act fails to
indicate whether that "position" means the governmental action that precipitated the suit or the stance taken by the United States in litigation,
and it provides only meager guidance regarding what constitutes a "substantially justified" position."1
Statutory incoherence and vagueness of this order impose enormous
burdens on the courts when trying to give life to the legislature's language. Sometimes we are able, by ascertaining the purposes underlying
the statute in question, to make some reasonably educated guesses as to
what Congress might have wanted to say had it considered a particular
problem more carefully. In other cases, however, the statute is rooted in
so many cross-cutting policies, the weight of each of which is virtually
impossible to determine, that we have no choice but frankly to exercise
our discretion and interpret a contested provision as we see fit. Adoption
of either approach, however, inevitably gives rise to a disagreement
among different judges and panels. The result is inconsistency and unpre-

109 See generally H. FRIENDLY, supra note 69, at 41-64; Lowi, Law, Power, and Knowledge, LAW QUADRANGLE NoTEs, Winter 1982, at 41-42; Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 401, 402 (1968); Wald, Some Observations on the Usage of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195 (1983).
"' Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1192 (1978) (codified as amended at scattered sections of
title 5 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1981)).
. See Devine v. White, 697 F.2d 421, 434-35 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
...Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 504, 504 note (1982)).
"' See Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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dictability in the interpretation of the law. When difficulties of this sort
are foreseeable-as they very often are-Congress abdicates its responsibility by not anticipating and, through more careful draftsmanship,
avoiding them.
I concede that there are limits on the ability of the legislature to relieve
the judiciary of the trials and tribulations attendant upon statutory interpretation. Obtaining agreement on clear and consistent statutory language among members of Congress prone to regard themselves as spokespersons for their constituencies (or for particular interest groups) is often
impossible.1 1 4 More importantly, it must be acknowledged that even a
perfectly unified Congress could not purge its products of all ambiguity
and tension. The fields covered by many modern federal statutes are extraordinarily complex-too complicated, certainly, to be comprehensively
mapped by even the most conscientious of legislatures. "1 5 More fundamentally, the words Congress must employ when putting together an enactment are inherently ambiguous to some extent." 6 Finally, it is frequently inevitable that, when legislators set out to regulate a new area,
they have only a tentative sense of the objectives they wish to achieve;
refinement of their purposes only becomes possible after they have been
able to watch, for some time, a regulatory scheme in action.' 1 7 Even admitting all this, however, it is incontrovertible that Congress could do
much better than it usually does now.
In addition to exercising more care in drafting statutes, Congress could
aid us a great deal by reviving a practice used by Parliament in its early
years. An important component of an early English statute was an explicit recitation of the act's purposes." 8 This was a boon to judicial interpretation. When trying to make sense of an ambiguous provision, the
courts at least had a clear notion of what the legislature was aiming at." 9
To be sure, many modern federal statutes contain preambles, but too
often they consist of little more than collections of innocuous platitudes.
Even when an introductory statement is more controversial and explicit,
courts are loath to rely heavily on it, on the theory that few members of
Congress anticipated that the language would significantly affect the operation of the statute and, consequently, that the preamble might well
not reflect fairly the legislators' true intent. The problem is thus circular.

See generally Lowi, supra note 109.
As Frankfurter observed 35 years ago: "The imagination which can draw an income
statute to cover the myriad transactions of a society like ours, capable of producing the
necessary revenue without producing a flood of litigation, has not yet revealed itself."
Frankfurter, supra note 22, at 528 (footnote omitted). Many fields of contemporary legislative action could be described in similar terms.
1,6 See Hart, supra note 19, at 607.
"7 See Frankfurter, supra note 22, at 529-29; Hart, supra note 19, at 627.
"I Frankfurter, supra note 22, at 541-42.
'19 Id. at 542.
",
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Only Congress can break the loop. If it begins to elaborate and take more
seriously its preambles, we will accord those introductory statements
more weight in our interpretations. The net result will be both greater
constraint on the activity of judicial construction and more effectual promotion of Congress' ends.
B.

Responding to Judicial Invitations

In the course of deciding appeals, we very often come across areas of
the law that cry out for kinds of minor reform or major change that the
legislature is best able to make. Few sittings fail to expose one or more
problems concerning outmoded statutes; 0 questions the legislature evidently never considered;1 21 and areas in which two or more regulatory systems work, in practice, at cross-purposes.
The proper thing to do in all such cases, of course, is to call the legislature's attention to the difficulty. Unfortunately, the capacity of courts to
get the legislature to look their way is sharply limited. On occasion, of
course, court opinions are studied when a statute has been struck down, a
conviction invalidated or an election blocked. But, even in such instances,
courts frequently have difficulty prompting any meaningful legislative response. And, in the vast majority of cases, when neither a statute nor an
executive action can responsibly be said to contravene a constitutional
provision, we can do little more than include some language in our opinions pleading for assistance and hope those opinions happen to land on
the desks of favorably inclined members of Congress.12 2
The limitations on the ability of the judiciary to initiate and sustain
conversations with the legislature make it all the more important that the
legislature listen for our occasional requests for aid. When it does not, or
when it hears but then turns a deaf ear on our pleas, one of two things
happens. By far the more common effect is that no one makes an effort to
reform the area of law in question. Any number of circumstances may
prompt the courts to refuse to act on their own: the field may be too
complex to be susceptible of judicial mapping; 12 3 a rule may be too em-

"0See generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 108.
is1 See generally Wald, supra note 109.
"'
Professor Calabresi has proposed that we respond differently. Despairing of legislative
responsiveness, he suggests that the courts constitute themselves, in effect, legislative reform commissions and proceed to modify or abrogate statutes that both no longer enjoy
majoritarian support and do not "fit" with the current legal landscape. See G. CALABRESI,
supra note 108, at 163-66. I happen to think that adoption of such a strategy would be
highly unwise for the reasons recently sketched by one of my colleagues. See Mikva, Book
Review, 96 HARV. L. REv. 534 (1982) (reviewing G. CALABRESI, supra note 108). But, regardless of my sentiments on the matter, Calabresi's proposal is sufficiently radical as to have
little chance of being adopted in the foreseeable future. As my concern, in this essay, is with
feasible, incremental reforms, I will not pursue further Calabresi's interesting argument.
Ill A good example is the set of doctrines governing the immunity of governmental offiPublished by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1984
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bedded in the law to be excised without the sort of compensatory adjustments that only a legislature can make;"" the changes necessary to reconcile two regulatory schemes when they overlap at their margins may be
likely to have feedback effects on the rest of the programs in question,
effects too drastic for judicial control; etc. When any one of these conditions obtains, the court that discovers a problem will almost always decline to attempt to alter the law to solve it; the net effect is that the
difficulty goes unremedied indefinitely.
The other, less common effect is that the court moves ahead on its own.
In a few contexts, it has no choice but to do so; when a party has established a violation of constitutional rights, the court must devise a remedy
to provide redress and sometimes is obliged to structure a sweeping set of
12 5
In
constraints on executive action to curtail future similar violations.

cials from liability for the commission of constitutional torts. See Schuck, supra note 53.
124 Judge Traynor provides the following illustration:
What considerations make it preferable to leave liquidation to the legislature?
Sometimes it becomes quickly apparent that if liquidation is to do more good than
harm, there must also be construction of new rules of such scope that only the
legislature, with its freedom and resources for wholesale inquiry, can effectively
formulate them. Professor Wolfgang Friedmann has given us an apt example in
contributory negligence, about which judges remain deliberately passive. He notes
that "the continuing predominance of contributory, as distinct from comparative,
negligence in the great majority of American jurisdictions is assuredly out of tune
with elementary principles of fault responsibility, as well as the trends of contemporary legislation." In his view, however, "judicial reform in this field is impossible because a court cannot substitute comparative for contributory negligence
without enunciating the principles of apportionment to be applied." He adds that:
While this perhaps is not too convincing an argument in view of the old
judge-made admirality rules of comparative negligence, a more persuasive obstacle against judicial lawmaking in this field is the fact that the
effective carriers of liability are, in the great majority of cases, the insurance companies, and not the nominal parties. Judicial reform would
therefore affect the whole complicated-and partly regulated-structure
of insurance rates. It would also be difficult for the courts to proceed to
the other pole of limiting the imposition of complete liability in accident
cases to those involving "gross" negligence-in this writer's opinion a
desirable reform-although some rough lawmaking of this kind may occur in jury verdicts.
Traynor, supra note 5, at 233 (footnote omitted) (quoting Friedmann, Legal Philosophy
and Judicial Lawmaking, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 821, 841 (1961)). See also Kerr S.S. Co. v.
Radio Corp. of America, 245 N.Y. 284, 288, 157 N.E. 140, 142 (1927) (since a sender better
understands the risks of nondelivery, he is in a better position than a carrier to protect
against the risk of loss).
1'" The classic example of the promulgation of a set of rules to protect constitutional
rights-rules that might well be unnecessary if the legislature acted to set up an alternative
means of deterring violations-is the doctrine preventing the use in a criminal trial of evidence obtained as a result of violation of the defendant's rights. For a sensible discussion of
that doctrine and of other structurally similar remedial devices, see Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 H~Av. L. REv. 1
(1975).
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other instances, the court is not obliged, in the foregoing sense, to take
the initiative in restructuring an area of the law, but decides to do so
anyway. Impatient at the unresponsiveness of Congress or cynical about
the utility of requesting (and waiting for) legislative assistance and unwilling to allow the problem to continue, the court does its best to alter or
rearrange the pertinent doctrines. 2 s
Unilateral judicial action of the sort just described has two drawbacks.
First, usually the legislature has the information, expertise, and tools to
do a better job rebuilding the doctrinal structure than the judiciary is
capable of doing. When the judiciary attempts to do the renovation on its
own, consequently, it almost always creates a cruder (and shakier) edifice
than the legislature could have produced. Second, and perhaps more importantly, by taking the problem out of the hands of the representatives
of the people, the courts contribute incrementally to the stultification of
participatory democracy in this country. Justice Harlan put this point
27
sharply in his dissent in Wesberry v. Sanders:1
"What is done today
saps the political process. The promise of judicial intervention in matters
of this sort cannot but encourage popular inertia in efforts for political
reform through the political process, with the inevitable result that the
process is itself weakened."' 8 There is much wisdom in this view. What is
too often forgotten by its adherents, however, is that the virus that causes
the aforementioned much-bewailed disease is not judicial activism, but
failure on the part of the representatives of the people either to move to
halt practices that result in violations of individual rights or to respond to
efforts by the courts to involve them in the process of reform.
CONCLUSION

Since I have already reflected at length-possibly even too much-on
the role of a judge in modern society, it would be tiresome (and probably
presumptuous) of me to say more in conclusion. Indeed, the somewhat
amorphous nature of my topic defies any final statement.
Any conclusions that I may have are surely tentative. And, to the extent that my views have taken shape, my tentative conclusions are easily

126 Something of this sort seems to be occurring now in the area of official immunity, see
supra note 53; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (significantly modifying the "qualified immunity" doctrine in order to make possible more expeditious processing of claims
and to reduce the "chilling" effect on discretionary administrative action that the old doctrine seems to have created).
127 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (mandating equally populated congressional
districts in all states).
1 Id. at 48; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(relief in a democratic society must derive from the effect of the aroused public conscience
of elected representatives); Frankfurter, supra note 22, at 545-46; Wilkinson, supra note 92,
at 1205-06. Cf. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1059, 1073 (1980)
(discussing the importance of popular participation in societal decisionmaking).
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extracted from the foregoing sections of this article. New ideas, broader
conclusions and, conceivably, some bolder proposals for reform, will come
only with more time and maturity on the bench. For now, I am content to
end this reflective effort with a citation to the eminently sound and prophetic words of Professor G. Edward White:
[A] mode of minimally acceptable professional competence has
followed the judiciary through time, despite changes in the types
and forms of opinions. Oracular and mechanical jurisprudence
have given way to various twentieth-century theories, but analytical soundness, intelligibility, and rationality have been continuously associated with competent judging. These minimum requirements have been transcended in the great appellate opinions
of American history, opinions in which judging has resembled
high art and statecraft; yet they have thus far not been abandoned. They will remain in the future unless the appellate judiciary adopts an approach in which institutional power utterly replaces rational analysis, the euphemism becomes the sole means
of communication, and the tension between independence and accountability accordingly evaporates. At that point the American
judicial tradition will have lost its meaning."2 9

,2 G. WHIM, supra note 83, at 375 (footnote omitted).
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